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VOLTAIRE AND ROUSSEAU 

AGAINST THE ATHEISTS; 



OR, 



ESSAYS AND DETACHED PASSAGES PROM 
THOSE WRITERS, 

IN RELATION TO 

THE BEING AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD. 



SELECTED AND TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH, 

By J. AKERLY. 



* * * Jo vis omnia plena. — Virgil,, {Bucol. Eel. III.) 



NEW-YORK : 
WILEY AND PUTNAM. 

1845. 



t> 



rtt! 



Is 



The Library 
of Congress 

WASHINGTON 



Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1845, by 

J. AKERLY, 

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the Southern 
District of New-York. 



John F. Trow & Co., Printers, 
33 Ann- street, N. Y. 



VOLTAIRE 



FROM "IL FAUT PRENDRE UN PARTI"— WE MUST 
CHOOSE OUR SIDE. 

I do not allude to choosing sides between 
Russia and Turkey, for those countries will 
make peace sooner or later, without any in- 
terference of mine : 

Nor is the question whether we shall de- 
clare ourselves in favor of a British party 
against some other party, for both will soon 
disappear and make way for new ones : 

Nor do I propose to choose between the 
Christians of the Greek Church, the Armin- 
ians, the Eutychians, the Jacobites, the Chris- 
tians denominated Papists, the Lutherans, 



4 VOLTAIRE. 

the Calvinists, the Anglicans, the Primitives 
styled Quakers, the Anabaptists, the Jan- 
senists, the Molinists, the Socinians, the Pie- 
tists, and so many other ists. I desire to 
keep on good terms with all these gentle- 
men when I meet them, and to enter into no 
dispute with them ; for there is not one 
among them all who, if he should have oc- 
casion to divide a guinea with me, would not 
perfectly understand how much was due 
him, or who would be willing to lose an 
obolus for the salvation of my soul or of his. 

I shall not take sides between the old and 
new parliaments of France, for a few years 
hence we shall hear no more of either : 

Nor between the ancients and the mod- 
erns, for that is a dispute which will never 
be settled : 

Nor between the Jansenists and the Mol- 
inists, for they exist no longer, and h\e or 
six thousand volumes of their controversial 
works have become, thank God, as useless 
as the works of Saint Ephraim : 



VOLTAIRE. 5 

Nor between the French and Italian comic 
operas, for that is a matter of taste: 

But that to which I refer is a trifling little 
question, viz., — whether there is a God; — 
and this is what I am about to examine with 
great seriousness and good faith, for the sub- 
ject is interesting to me and you too. 

ON THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION. 

Every thing is in motion ; every thing in 
nature acts and reacts. 

Our sun turns on its axis with a rapidity 
which amazes us, and other suns turn like- 
wise, while an innumerable multitude of 
planets revolve in their orbits around them. 
The blood circulates more than twenty times 
an hour in the lowest of our animals. A 
straw, borne by the wind, tends by its nature 
to the centre of the earth, as the earth is at- 
tracted by the sun, and the sun by it. The 
everlasting flux and reflux of the ocean is 
attributable to the same laws. It is in pur- 



Q VOLTAIRE. 

suance of the same laws that the vapors 
which form our atmosphere escape continu- 
ally from the earth and fall again in the 
shape of dew, rain, hail, snow, and thunder- 
storms. 

All is action; even death is active. The / 
bodies of the dead are decomposed, transform 
themselves into vegetables, and afford nour- 
ishment for the living, who, in their turn, 
nourish others in the same manner. 

What is the principle of this universal 
action ? 

That principle must be one. The con- 
stant uniformity discoverable in the laws * 
which regulate the revolutions of the hea- 
venly bodies and in the motion of our globe, 
and which is found to prevail also in every 
species and genus of animals, vegetables, and 
minerals, indicates one mover only. If there 
were two, they would be either different 
from each other, or hostile to each other, or 
similar to each other. Were they different, 
there w T ould be no mutual adaptation in the 



VOLTAIRE. 7 

works of nature. Were they hostile, all 
things would destroy each other. If they 
are similar, it is as if there were but one : 
there is, in that case, one more than is 
required. 

I am confirmed in the belief that there is 
but a single principle, a single mover, the 
moment I direct my attention to the un- 
changing and uniform laws pervading all 
nature. 

The same gravitation penetrates into all 
the heavenly bodies, and impels them toward 
each other, not in proportion to their extent 
of surface (for that might result from the 
influence of a fluid), but in proportion to their 
mass or quantity of matter. 

The squares of the periodic times of the 
planets are to each other in the same pro- 
portion as the cubes of their distances from 
the sun ; and this, let me remark in passing, 
establishes what Plato had divined (I know 
not how), that the world is the work of the 
Everlasting Geometer.^ 



8 VOLTAIRE. 

The rays of light are reflected and refract- 
ed through the whole extent of the universe. 
All mathematical truths must be such in the 
star Sirius, as much as in our little dwelling- 
place. 

If I turn my eyes upon the animal king- 
dom, I perceive that all quadrupeds and all 
bipeds without w 7 ings perpetuate their spe- 
cies by the same copulation, and that all 
their females are viviparous. 

The females of all birds are oviparous. 

All the species of the same genus propa- 
gate in the same manner and subsist on the 
same food. 

Plants of the same genus have the same 
fundamental properties. 

Assuredly the oak and the hazel have 
never contracted with each other that they 
would be reproduced and grow in the same 
way, any more than the planets, Mars and 
Saturn, have agreed with each other to be 
governed by the same laws. 

Then there exists one universal and pow- 



VOLTAIRE. 9 

erful Intelligence, which always acts by un- 
varying laws. 

No one, on seeing an armillary sphere, a 
painted landscape, drawings in which ani- 
mals are represented, or anatomical prepa- 
rations of colored wax, doubts that they are 
the productions of skilful artists. Can it be 
that these copies imply an intelligent maker, 
and that the originals do nothing of the kind'? 
This of itself appears to me the most con- 
vincing demonstration of the existence of a 
God, and I cannot conceive in what way it 
can be answered. 



OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ACTION AS NECESSARY 
AND ETERNAL. 

This one mover is very powerful, other- 
wise he could not regulate so vast and com- 
plicated a machine. 

He is very intelligent, since we, wiio are < 
intelligent, can produce nothing equal to the 
least of the springs of this machine. 



10 VOLTAIRE. 

He is a necessary being, inasmuch as the^ 
machine could not exist, but for him. 

He is eternal, for he cannot have sprung 
from nonentity, which being nothing can [ 
produce nothing ; and as soon as something 
exists, it is clear that something has existed 
from all eternity. This sublime truth has 
now become trite. Such has been the pro- 
gress of the human mind in our times, not- 
withstanding the efforts our teachers of ig- 
norance have put forth during so many ages 
to degrade us. 

WHERE IS THE FIRST PRINCIPLE ? IS IT INFINITE ? 

When the animal called a man demon- 
strates to me a geometrical proposition, or 
when he raises a weight, I do not see the 
first principle of his intelligence and his mo- 
tions. Still I believe that there is one within 
him, inferior being as he is. I cannot dis- 
cover whether this first principle is in his 
heart, or his head, or his blood, or his whole 



VOLTAIRE. 11 

body. In the same manner I infer that there 
is a first principle in nature, and I see that 
it is impossible that that principle should not 
be everlasting. But where is it 1 

If it animates all that IS, it must be in all 
that IS. This seems unquestionable. It is 
in all that exists, as motion is in all the body 
of an animal, if I may be permitted to make 
use of so inadequate a comparison. 

But if it is in what exists, can it be in 
what does not exist ? Is the universe infi- 
nite 1 So we are told ; but who can prove 

it? 

# # * * % # 

I know no reason why God should be 
infinite. His nature, I apprehend, is to be 
wherever there is any thing ; but why and 
how should existing things be infinite? 
Newton has proved the possibility of a va- 
cuum, which till then had only been suppo- 
sed. If there is vacuity in nature, there can 
be vacuity beyond the limits of nature. What 
necessity is there that beings should have 



|2 VOLTAIRE. 

infinite extension 1 What is infinite exten- 
sion ? There can be no such thing, any more 
than any number is infinite. There is no 
number and no degree of extension to which 
additions cannot be made. On this point 
the opinions of Cudworth are more correct 
than those of Clarke. 

God, says Clarke, is present every where. 
Yes, doubtless, every where where any thing 
is, but not where there is nothing at all. To 
be present to nothing seems to me a contra- 
diction, an absurdity. I am forced to admit 
eternity, but I am not forced to admit that 
there is such a thing as infinity. 

In fine, what matters it to me, whether 
space be a real being or a mere conception 
of my understanding? What matters it, 
whether the necessary, intelligent, powerful, J t 
eternal, all-creating Being be or be not in^, 
that imaginary space % In either case, am 
I the less his work ? Am I the less depend- 
ent upon him 1 Is he the less my master 1 , 
I perceive this master of the universe with 






VOLTAIRE. 13 

the eyes of my understanding ; but I cannot 
perceive him beyond the bounds of the uni- 
verse. 

The dispute, whether infinite space be a 
real being or not, still continues. I am not 
willing to found my opinion on so unsafe a 
basis — on a controversy worthy of the school- 
men ; nor am I willing to make God's throne 
rest in imaginary space. 

To compare once more small things which 
seem great to us, w T ith what is great in real- 
ity, let us suppose that an alguazil at Ma- 
drid should endeavor to convince one of his 
Castilian neighbors that the king of Spain 
is master of the sea which lies north of Cal- 
ifornia, and should contend that whoever 
doubts this is guilty of high treason. The 
Castilian might answer, " I do not even know 
that there is any sea on the other side of 
California ; and it is of little importance to 
me whether there be or not, so long as I 
have the means of living at Madrid. No 
discovery of that sea is required to teach me 



14 VOLTAIRE. 

that I am under obligation to be faithful to 
the king, my master, on the banks of the 
Manc,anares. Whether there be or be not 
any ships beyond Hudson's bay, his right to 
command me here remains unchanged. I 
feel my dependence on him at Madrid, be- 
cause I know that he is the master of the 
city." 

So, too, we are dependent on the Great 
Being, not because he is present out of the '"* 
world, but because he is present in it. 

I have only to entreat the forgiveness of 
the Ruler of Nature for having compared 
him to a frail man, that I might the better 
illustrate my meaning. 



THAT THE FIRST PRINCIPLE, THE ETERNAL 
BEING, ARRANGED ALL VOLUNTARILY. 

It is manifest that the Supreme, Necessa-'X 
ry, and Active Intelligence has a will, and 
that he has ordered all things because he has 
so willed. For how could he act and form 



VOLTAIRE. 15 

every thing without willing ? He would be, 
on that supposition, a mere machine, and 
that machine would imply another first prin- 
ciple — another mover. We should still have 
to recur to some primary being endowed 
with intelligence. We exercise volition, we 
act, we construct, machines in pursuance of 
our will ; and so the great and mighty Demi- 
ourgos* created all because he so willed. 

Spinoza himself recognizes in nature an 
intelligent and necessary power. But an 
intelligence destitute of will would be an ab- 
surdity, for it would serve no end and would 
effect nothing ; the will to effect any thing 
being wanting. Consequently, the great 
and necessary Being has willed all that he 
has done. 



* Demiourgos, workman, maker. It was often applied to 
the Deity by the Greek philosophers, as : * * * y AXX ovxoj 
ye ay.o7Tovfievo) navv eoixs xavxa oocpov rivbq S rj ill ov qy ox ttal 
cpiXo^wov xexv^aaxt. — Xenophon, {Mem. Soc.} Oeol -frewv, 
wv iyoi drj inov Qybq, v.. x. X. — Plato, (TimcBUS.) MijxoC- 
vvv xov ye &ebv a^ioHJcapev rtoxe &vrix6)V 8t\^iovqy (av cpavXo- 
xegov, x. x. X. — Plato, (De Legg.) Translator. 



16 VOLTAIRE. 

I have before remarked that he created all 
necessarily ; for if his works were not neces- 
sary, they would be useless. But does this 
necessity nullify his free will 1 Certainly 
not. I necessarily will that I may be happy. 
I do not will this the less because I necessa- 
rily will it ; on the contrary, I will it only 
the more forcibly from the fact that my will 
is invincible. 

Does this necessity deprive him of his free 
agency ? Not at all. Free agency is noth- 
ing else than the power of acting. As then 
the Supreme Being is powerful in the high- 
est degree, he is the freest of beings. 

Thus, therefore, the great Artificer of the 
universe is shown to be necessary, eternal,. ( 
intelligent, powerful, capable of volition, and 
free. 



VOLTAIRE. 17 

FROM " LE PHILOSOPHE IGNORANT.' 

ONE SUPREME ARTIFICER. 

A large part of mankind, seeing moral 
and physical evil spread throughout the 
globe, imagined that there were two pow- 
erful beings ; one of whom wrought all the 
good, and the other all the evil. 
s~ If two such beings existed, they would 
exist necessarily ; they would be everlasting 
and independent ; they would also occupy 
all space, would exist, therefore, in the same 
place, and each would penetrate the other ; 
which is absurd. 

The notion of these two conflicting pow- 
ers must have originated in the examples we 
witness on earth. We see around us some 
men that are mild, and others that are fero- 
cious, useful animals and noxious ones, kind 
masters and tyrants. This suggested the 
idea of two hostile powers presiding over 
nature, which is but an Asiatic romance. 



18 VOLTAIRE. 

All nature exhibits unity of purpose. The 
laws of motion and gravity are invariable. 
It is impossible that two supreme artificers, 
entirely opposed to each other, should have 
followed the same laws. This argument is, 
in my judgment, sufficient of itself to over- 
throw the doctrine of the Manicheans, and 
there is no need of encountering them with 
cumbrous volumes. 

There exists, therefore, a Power, unique, 
eternal, with whom every thing is connected, 
on whom every thing depends, but whose 
nature I am unable to comprehend. 



FROM "TOUT EN DIEU." 

Commentaire sur Malebranche. 
GOD THE CAUSE OF ALL THINGS. 

It is certain that we cannot give ourselves 
any sensation ; we cannot even imagine 
any except such as we have experienced. 



VOLTAIRE. 19 

Though every academy in Europe should 
offer a prize for the invention of a new sense, 
the prize would never be awarded. We can 
do nothing purely of ourselves, whether there 
be an invisible and intangible being in our 
cerebellum or not. And it must be confess- 
ed, whatever system we adopt, that the Au- 
thor of nature has bestowed upon us all that 
we have — organs, sensations — and ideas, 
which are the consequence of the latter. 

As we are thus placed at his disposal, 
/ Malebranche, notwithstanding all his errors, 
was right in declaring, philosophically, that 
we are in God, and that we behold every 
thing in God. Saint Paul says the same 
thing in the language of theology, and Ara- 
tus and Cato in that of the moralists. 

What, then, are we to understand by the 
expression, behold every thing in God 7* 

* The doctrine of Malebranche, if I rightly apprehend the 
opinions of that subtle metaphysician, is briefly as follows: 

That ideas are not mere modes, properties, or attributes, 
but real entities : 



20 VOLTATRE. 

Either these are unmeaning words, or they 
signify that all our ideas are from God f\y 



That God must have created each of his works in pursu- 
ance of a previous idea in himself: 

That there exists a kind of repository of ideas (or etendue 
intelligible, as Malebranche denominates it), which is embo- 
somed, as it were, in God, and is a part of Him, and which 
contains the archetypes or model-ideas, not only of all that 
is, has been, or will be, but of all that can be ; — of all things 
that are possible : 

That when we look on external objects, we do not see the 
objects themselves, but the intimate union between the hu- 
man soul and God enables us to perceive the ideal exem- 
plars of those objects in that portion of God's substance which 
constitutes the etendue intelligible; and we may therefore 
be said to see God, and to see all things in God. 

The following passage, which I translate from the work of 
Malebranche entitled Dela Recherche de la Verite, will per- 
haps exhibit his views more clearly. It is from the chapter, 
" Que nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu." 

"A great number of passages may be found in the writings 
of St. Augustine, by which he attempts to prove that we see 
God, even in this life, by the knowledge which we possess of 
eternal truths. Truth, he observes, is uncreated, immuta- 
ble, immeasurable, everlasting, superior to all else. It is 
true by its own nature ; its perfection is not derived from 
any thing ; it renders created beings more perfect ; and all 
spirits naturally endeavor to become acquainted with it. 
Nothing but God can possess all these perfections. Then 
Truth is God. 



VOLTAIRE. 21 

What is meant by receiving ideas ? When 
we receive, we do not create them ; then 
they are created by God, just as it is God, not 
we, who originates motion. All, therefore, 
is but the action of God upon his creatures. 



a We see some of these immutable and eternal truths. 
Then we see God. 

" Such is St. Augustine's mode of reasoning. My own is 
somewhat different, and I would not unfairly take advantage 
of the authority of so great a name to support my own views. 

" My opinion, then, is that truths, far from being God him- 
self, are not even substantive beings ; and that this is the case 
even with those which are eternal, such as that twice two 
make four. For it is apparent that this truth consists mere- 
ly in a relation of equality between 4 and twice 2. I say, 
therefore, that we see God, not as St. Augustine maintains, 
when we see these truths, but when we perceive the ideas 
of them, for the ideas are actual beings ; while the equality 
between the ideas, which is the truth itself, is not a real be- 
ing. When, for example, we measure a piece of cloth and 
say that it is three ells long, the cloth and the ells are real 
beings. But the equality between the three ells and the 
cloth is not a real being ; it is a mere relation. When we 
say that twice 2 are 4, the ideas of the numbers are actual 
entities ; but the equality between them is only a relation. 
Thus, according to my view, we see God when we perceive 
everlasting truths ; not that these truths are God, but be- 
cause the ideas on which they depend are in God," &c, &c. 

Translator, 



22 VOLTAIRE. 

GOD INSEPARABLE FROM ALL NATURE. 

It must not thence be inferred that he re- 
mains in perpetual contact with his works 
by particular acts and exercises of volition. 
We are prone always to make God in our 
likeness. Sometimes we represent him as 
an absolute monarch issuing orders to the 
servants in his palace; sometimes as a work- 
man attending to the wheels of his machine. 
But can the man who makes a right use of 
his reason, conceive of God as aught else 
than an ever active principle % If he was 
once a principle, he must be so every mo- 
ment, for his nature cannot change. The 
comparison of the sun and its light to God 
and his productions is, no doubt, imperfect ; 
but it furnishes an idea, however faint and 
defective, of an ever-subsisting cause and its 
ever-subsisting effects. 

In short, it is merely as a parrot or an 
idiot that I utter the name of God, if I have 
not the idea of a cause which is necessary, 



VOLTAIRE. 23 

immeasurable, active, present to all its ef- 
fects, in all places, and at all times. 

I cannot here be met with the objections 
advanced against Spinoza. He was told 
that he had made a God at once intelligent 
and stupid, spirit and squash, wolf and lamb, 
who robbed and was robbed, murdered and 
was murdered ; that his God was a perpet- 
ual contradiction. But I do not make the 
universe God. I hold that the universe is 
an emanation from him, and would observe 
(to recur again to the feeble comparison of 
which I have spoken), that a beam of light 
darted from the sun, and absorbed in the fil- 
thiest of sewers, does not leave the small- 
est stain upon the luminary from which it 
proceeds, nor does the sewer prevent the 
sun from vivifying all nature throughout our 
globe. 

It may be objected, however, that the 
beam, being an emanation from the sun, 
comes from its very substance ; and that if 
God's works are emanations from him, they 



24 VOLTAIRE. 

are parts of him. Hence I should fear to 
convey a false idea of God, by appearing to 
consider him as composed of parts — and 
those, too, unconnected parts — parts hostile 
to each other. On this point I repeat what 
I have already remarked, that my compari- 
son is extremely imperfect, and that it serves 
only to furnish a faint image of what cannot 
be represented by images. I might say, 
moreover, that a sunbeam passing into the 
mire does not mingle with the latter, but 
preserves its invisible essence. Yet it is 
better to confess that even the purest light 
is not an adequate emblem of the Deity. 
Light emanates from the sun, and all things 
emanate from God. We know not how it 
is ; but, I repeat, we cannot conceive of God 
except as the necessary Being from whom 
all emanates. The multitude regard him 
as a despot who keeps bailiffs in his ante- 
chamber. 

I consider all other images which have 
been employed to shadow forth this Princi- 



VOLTAIRE. 25 

pie — a Principle all-pervading, necessarily 
self-existent, necessarily active throughout 
immeasurable extension — as still more in- 
correct than the comparison drawn from the 
sun and his rays. He has been described 
as riding the winds, borne on the clouds, 
surrounded with thunders and lightnings, 
holding converse with the elements, swell- 
ing the waves of the ocean. All this is but 
the expression of our littleness. It is, in 
truth, highly ridiculous to place in the midst 
of a fog, half a league from our petty globe, 
the everlasting Principle of all the millions 
of globes revolving in immensity. Our light- 
nings and thunders, which are seen and 
heard in a circuit of not more than four or 
five leagues at farthest, are but insignificant 
effects which are lost in the great whole; 
and this great whole is what we ought to 
bear in mind when speaking of God. 

(it must be the same power which passes 
from our planetary system to the other plan- 
etary systems thousands and thousands of 
2 



26 VOLTAIRE, 

times more remote from us than our globe is 
from Saturn. The stars are all governed by 
the same eternal laws, for if the centripetal 
and centrifugal forces influence our world, 
they influence the neighbouring one ; and so 
on, throughout the universe. The light of 
Sirius must be the same with that of our sun ; 
it must possess the same degree of tenuity, 
the same velocity, the same force ; it must 
likewise be emitted on all sides in right 
lines ; and its intensity, also, must vary in- 
versely as the square of the distance. 

As the light of the fixed stars, which are 
so many suns, reaches us in a given time ; so 
in reciprocation, that of our sun reaches 
them in a given time. As the rays and 
beams of our sun are subject to refraction, 
so, unquestionably, the rays of the other suns, 
darted in like manner upon their attending 
planets, are refracted in precisely the same 
mode, if they strike the same media. 
^^.As this refraction is necessary to sight, 
these planets must contain beings possessing 



VOLTAIRE. 21 

the faculty of seeing. It is not probable that 
so excellent a way of turning light to ac- 
count is left unemployed in the other globes. 
The instrument being there, we may reason- 
ably suppose that it is used. Let us always 
set out with these two principles — (that noth- 
ing is uselessjand that the great laws of na- 
ture are every where the same — and it will 
follow that the innumerable suns kindled in 
the immensity of space dispense light to in- 
numerable planets ; that the rays have the 
same properties as on our little earth ; and 
that animals enjoy the benefit of them. Of 
all beings and of all the forms in which the 
Great Being manifests himself, light is that 
which gives us the most enlarged idea of the 
Divinity, far as it is from fully representing 
him. 

In truth, when we have surveyed the ana- 
tomical structure of the animals of our globe, 
we know not whether the inhabitants of the 
other globes possess similar organs : when 



28 VOLTAIRE, 

we have made ourselves acquainted with 
the weight, elasticity, and uses of our atmos- 
phere, we are ignorant whether the orbs 
revolving around Sirius or Aldebaran are 
encompassed with air resembling ours : our 
briny ocean does not prove that there are 
oceans in the other planets : but light is ev- 
ery where. Our nights are illuminated by a 
host of suns. It is by light that from a cor- 
ner of this little ball on w T hich man crawls, 
a perpetual correspondence is kept up be- 
tween all those worlds and us. Saturn Jooks 
upon us, and we upon Saturn. Sirius, which 
we behold, may also behold us, and certain- 
ly does behold our sun, although there inter- 
venes between the two a distance such that 
a cannon ball, moving at the rate of twelve 
hundred yards in a second, could not trav- 
erse it in a hundred and four billions of years. 
Light is, in reality, a swift messenger fly- 
ing through the great whole, from world to 
world. It has some of the properties of 



VOLTAIRE. 29 

matter and some that are higher than those; 
and if any thing can afford some faint, inci- 
pient idea, some imperfect apprehension of 
God, it is light, which, like him, is every 
where, and, like him, operates everywhere.-/ 



FROM THE "HOMELIES." 

(Premiere Homelie.) 

■ * # * Destroy men's belief in an 
avenging and remunerating Deity, and Sylla 
and Marius bathe with delight in the blood 
of their fellow-citizens ; the cruelties of Au- 
gustus, Antonius and Lepidus, surpass the 
atrocities of Sylla ; Nero in cold blood caus- 
es his mother to be put to death. It is cer- 
tain that the fear of an avenging God had 
then disappeared among the Romans. Athe- 
ism was prevalent, and it would not be dif- 
ficult to prove from history that atheism 
may sometimes produce as much evil as the 
most barbarous superstitions; 



30 VOLTAIRE. 

Think you that Pope Alexander VI. be-, 
lieved there was a God, when, to promote 
the interests of his son, the offspring of incest, 
he had recourse in turn to treachery, open 
violence, the stiletto, the halter, and poison; 
and when, in mockery of the superstitious 
weakness of those whom he assassinated, he 
gave them absolution and indulgences in the 
midst of the convulsions of death % Certainly, 
these horrible barbarities upon men w 7 ere 
insults to the Divinity whom he derided. 
Let us all confess that in reading the history 
of this monster and his detestable son, we 
experience a wish that they may be punish- 
ed. The idea of an avenging God is neces- 
sary therefore. 

It may and does too often happen that, 
though convinced of God's justice, men give 
way to the fury of their passions. They are 
then in a state of intoxication. Remorse 
does not come upon them until reason has 
resumed her authority, but then it torments 
the guilty. The atheist may feel, instead 



VOLTAIRE. 31 

of remorse, that secret and gloomy horror 
which accompanies the commission of great 
crimes. The condition of his soul is harass- 
ing and unhappy. A man who is stained 
with blood can no longer taste the sweets 
of society ; his spirit becomes ruffianly, and 
enjoys none of the delights of life ; he is 
frantic as a madman; — but he does not re- 
pent. He has no fear of being called to an 
account for the victims he has made. He 
will always be wicked, and will become 
hardened in ferocity. 

On the contrary, the man who believes in 
God will recover from his excitement. He 
can be violent but for a moment, while the 
atheist is a monster all his life. Why 1 Be- 
cause there is a check which restrains the 
former, while the latter has nothing to con- 
trol him. 

uWe do not read that the Archbishop of 
Troll, who caused all the magistrates of 
Stockholm to be murdered before his eyes, 
ever condescended even to pretend to atone 



32 VOLTAIRE. 

for his crime by the slightest penitence. An 
atheist, provided he be sure of impunity so 
far as man is concerned, reasons and acts 
consistently in being dishonest, ungrateful, a 
slanderer, a robber, and a murderer. For if 
there is no God, this monster is his own god, 
and sacrifices to his purposes whatever he de- 
sires and whatever stands as an obstacle in 
his path. The most moving entreaties, the 
most cogent arguments have no more effect 
upon him than on a wolf thirsting for blood. 
| When the two Medici were assassinated 
by order of Pope Sixtus IV., in a church, at 
the instant when the god adored by the 
multitude was raised that they might look 
upon him, the pope, tranquil in his palace, 
had nothing to fear, whether the plot should 
succeed or miscarry. He well knew that 
the Florentines would never dare avenge 
themselves; that he could excommunicate 
them at his ease, and that they would kneel 
and ask his forgiveness for having ventured 
to complain. 



VOLTAIRE. 33 

It is altogether probable that all the pow- 
erful men who have passed their lives in that 
round of crimes which fools denominate 
strokes of policy, revolutionary remedies, art 
of governing, &c, have been atheists, f * 



FROM THE " HONNETETES LITTE- 
RAIRES." 

(Vingt-septieme HonnHete.) 

I have always been convinced that athe- 
ism cannot do any good, and may do very 
great harm. I have pointed out the infinite 
difference between the sages who have writ- 
ten against superstition and the madmen 
who have written against God. \There is 
neither philosophy nor morality in any sys- 
tem of atheism. 

In none do I see any philosophy : for, in 
truth, is it reasoning to recognize the evi- 
dences of genius in one of the spheres of Ar- 
2* 



34 VOLTAIRE. 

chimedes or Posidonius, and in one of those 
orreries that are sold in England, and yet 
to recognize no such evidences in the work- 
manship of the universe? — to admire the 
copy, and yet persist in refusing to see any 
intelligence in the original from which the 
copy is taken % Is not this more absurd than 
if one were to say that the engravings from 
Raphael's paintings were made by an intel- 
ligent artist, but that the paintings made O 
themselves ! 

*7t* */v* *?? w *a* *n* 



FROM " DIEU ET LES HOMMES." 

aWhat other restraint could be laid on cu- 
'pidity and on secret and unpunished trans- 
gressions than the idea of an eternal master 
who sees us, and will judge even our most 
hidden thoughts 1 I know not who was the 
first to teach men this doctrine. If I did, 



VOLTAIRE. 35 

and were sure that he did not go farther and 
corrupt the medicine which he offered to 
mankind, I would erect an altar in his honor. 



FROxM THE "DICTIONNAIRE PHILO- 
SOPHIQUE." 

(Article u Dieu") 

/For my part, in nature as in art, I see 
nothing but final causes ; and I as much be- 
lieve that apple-trees were made for the 
purpose of bearing apples, as that watches 
are made for the purpose of showing the 
time of day. 



FROM A LETTER TO M. MARTIN KAHLE. 

I shall always be of the opinion that a 
clock proves a clock-maker, and that the 
universe proves a God. 



36 VOLTAIRE. 

FROM THE "HISTOIRE DE JENNI." 

* * * Italy, in the fifteenth cen~y 
tury, was full of atheists — and what was the 
consequence ? Cases of poisoning were as 
common as invitations to supper ; and there 
was no more hesitation in plunging a stiletto 
into the heart of one's friend than in embra- 
cing him. There were teachers of crime, 
just as there are now teachers of music or 
mathematics. * * * 






FROM THE SAME. 

Birton — With you, I will call that intelli- ,. 
gent and powerful Principle which animates 
all nature, God. But has he deigned to 
make himself known to us 1 

Friend — Yes, in his works. 

Birton — Has he dictated to us his laws ? 
Has he spoken to us 1 



VOLTAIRE. 37 

Friend— Yes, by the voice of our con- 
science. Is it not the fact that, if you had 
killed your father and mother, your con- 
science would harrow up your soul with 
remorse as terrible as it would be involun- 
tary 1 Is not this truth felt and admitted 
by the whole world ? Now let us descend 
to crimes of less magnitude, Is there one 
which does not alarm you at the first glance 
— which does not make you turn pale, the 
first time that you commit it — or which does 
not leave within you the sting of repentance % 

•ii. >A£, AU »ii» -i£* -it. -SL* 

-TV -TF "W *7f" Tv TV" 'Tv 

/-God, by addressing himself to your heart, 
has expressly commanded you never to de- 
base yourself by doing what is manifestly 
criminal. And as to all those equivocal acts 
which some condemn and others justify, 
what better rule can we adopt than to ad- 
here to that great maxim of the first of the 
Zoroasters, which has been so much dwelt 
upon in our time by a French author : 

? mm - a " " nMitt M " "" a " 



38 VOLTAIRE. 

which you contemplate be good or bad, abstain 
from itJl, 



FROM THE "TRAITE DE META- 
PHYSIQUE." 

I propose to institute an inquiry into the 
nature of the thinking faculty in the differ- 
ent species of men ; to examine whence we 
derive our ideas ; whether we have a soul 
distinct from the body ; whether the soul is 
immortal ; whether it is free ; whether it 
has virtues and vices, &c. But as the great- 
er part of these questions are connected with 
that of the existence or non-existence of 
God, it seems proper to begin by endeavor- 
ing to fathom the abyss of this great subject. 
Now, more than ever, let us divest ourselves 
of all passion and prejudice, and see in good 
faith what solution we can obtain by our 
reason, of the inquiry, Is there, or is there not, 
a God? 



VOLTAIRE. 39 

I observe, in the first place, that there are 
nations who have no knowledge of a cre- 
ating Deity. These people are barbarous, it 
is true, and few in number ; but still they 
are men : and if the knowledge of God's ex- 
istence were a necessary attribute of human 
nature, the savage Hottentots would have 
as sublime an idea of a supreme being as we 
ourselves. Moreover, among civilized na- 
tions, children have not the least conception 
of a God. It is difficult to make them com- 
prehend the idea ; they often pronounce the 
word God all their lives without attaching 
to it any definite meaning. We find, also, 
that men differ as much in their notions of 
God as in their religions and laws. Hence I 
cannot refrain from saying to myself, " Is it 
possible that the knowledge of God, our 
creator, our preserver, our all, is less neces- 
sary to man than his corporeal members — 
than a nose and the five fingers of each 
hand, for example 7 Every man comes into 
the world with a nose and five fingers, but 



40 VOLTAIRE. 

not one possesses at birth any knowledge of 
God. Whether it be a subject for regret or 
not, the fact is undeniable." 

Let us examine whether we ultimately 
acquire this knowledge in the same way as 
we attain to an acquaintance with mathe- 
matical principles, and with some metaphys- 
ical ideas. In so important an inquiry, what 
more judicious course can we pursue than to 
weigh whatever can be urged on either side, 
and adopt the conclusion which shall appear 
to us to be most in conformity with our 
reason ? 



SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE 
EXISTENCE OF GOD. 

There are two modes of arriving at the 
idea of a being who presides over the uni- 
verse. The one which to ordinary minds is 
the most natural and complete, is to direct 
the attention not only to the order which 
reigns in the universe, but also to the end 



VOLTAIRE. 41 

with an eye to which every thing appears to 
have been created. Many a huge volume 
has been written on this subject, yet the 
contents of them all may be reduced to the 
following reasoning : 

When I see a watch, the hand of which 
marks the hours, I conclude that an intelli- 
gent being arranged the springs of this piece 
of mechanism loith a vieio to the indication 
of the hours by the hand. So, when I see 
the springs of the human body, I conclude 
that an intelligent being arranged these 
organs to be received and nourished nine 
months in the womb ; that eyes were fur- 
nished for the purpose of seeing ; hands, that 
objects might be grasped, &c. But from 
this consideration alone, I can onJy infer the 
probability that an intelligent and superior 
being has skilfully prepared and fashioned 
matter. I cannot conclude from it alone that 
this being created matter out of nothing, or 
that he is infinite in every respect. I strive 
in vain to trace in my mind any connec- 



42 VOLTAIRE. 

tion between the following ideas : " It is 
probable that I am the creature of a being 
more powerful than myself; hence that be- 
ing has existed from all eternity ; hence he 
created every thing ; hence he is infinite, 
&c." I cannot perceive that the premises 
above stated lead directly to the conclusions 
there drawn from them. I perceive only 
that there is something which is more pow- 
erful than myself, but nothing farther. 

The other mode of reasoning to which I 
adverted in the opening of my remarks, is 
more metaphysical and less easy to be ap- 
prehended by minds wanting in acute per- 
ceptions, but it opens a far wider field of 
knowledge. It is, in brief, as follows : 

I exist; then something exists. If some- 
thing exists, something has existed from all 
eternity ; for what exists either is self-exist- 
ent or has had its existence communicated 
to it by another being. If what exists is 
self-existent, it exists necessarily ; it always 
has existed necessarily ; and it is God. If 



VOLTAIRE. 43 

what exists has had existence communica- 
ted to it from another being, and that other 
has derived its existence from a third, the 
last being must necessarily be God. For it 
is not conceivable that one being can bestow 
existence on another, unless the former pos- 
sesses creative power ; and to say that a 
thing received not merely its form, but its 
existence from a second thing, and that this 
second thing received its existence from a 
third ; the third from a fourth, and so on in 
infinite succession, is to utter an absurdity, 
inasmuch as all these beings would exist 
without any cause for their existence. Taken 
all in the mass, they would have no external 
cause ; taken each by itself, they would have 
no internal cause : that is to say, taken all 
together, they would owe their existence to 
nothing ; taken singly, none of them would 
be self-existent : then it follows that none of 
them exists necessarily. 

. I am then obliged to confess that there is 
a being necessarily and from all eternity 



44 VOLTAIRE. 

self-existent, and that this being is the 
source of all others. Hence it results that 
he is infinite in duration, immensity, and 
power — for what restraint is there upon 
him? 

But, it may be said, the material world is 
the very being we are searching after. Let 
us inquire in all sincerity whether that be 
probable. 

If the material world exists of itself, by 
absolute necessity, it would imply a contra- 
diction in terms to suppose that the smallest 
part of the universe could be different in any 
particular from what it is ; for if that part 
exists at the present moment by absolute 
necessity ', the very word excludes every other 
mode of being. Now, the table on which I 
write, the pen that I use, certainly have not 
always been what they now are ; the thoughts 
which I commit to paper did not exist a mo- 
ment ago, and consequently they do not 
necessarily exist. But if each part does not 
exist by absolute necessity, it is impossible 



VOLTAIRE. 45 

that the whole should be self-existent. I 
produce a motion ; then the motion did not 
exist before ; then motion is not essential to 
matter; then the motion of matter comes 
from something else than itself; then there 
is a God by whom motion is impressed upon 
it. So, likewise, intelligence is not essential 
to matter, for a rock or a heap of wheat does ( 
not think. Whence, then, do those portions 
of matter which do think and feel derive the 
faculty of thinking and feeling 1 It cannot 
be from themselves, for they feel in spite of 
themselves ; it cannot be from matter in 
general, because thought and sensation are 
not essential to matter. They must have 
received these properties, then, at the hand 
of a being, who is supreme, intelligent, in- 
finite, and the primary cause of all other 
beings. 

These, in a few words, are the evidences 
of the existence of a God, and are the out- 



46 VOLTAIRE, 

line of many volumes — an outline which the 
reader can fill up at his own convenience. 

Below are given, with equal brevity, the 
objections which may be urged against this 
doctrine. 



OBJECTIONS TO THE BELIEF IN THE EXISTENCE 
OF GOD. 



First Objection, 

If the material world is not itself God, it 
was created by him ; or (if that be prefer- 
red) he delegated the power to create it to 
some other being, which amounts to the 
same thing. In making this world he either 
created it out of nonentity or out of his own 
divine substance. He cannot have formed 
it out of nonentity, for that is nothing at all; 
he cannot have formed it from himself, since 
in that case, the world would be a part of 
the divine essence: consequently, I cannot 
have any idea of creation, and hence I can- 
not admit that creation took place. 



VOLTAIRE, 47 

Second Objection. 

If God made the world, he must have done 
so either by necessity or of his own free will. 

If by necessity, it must have always been 
made, for the same necessity existed from 
all eternity; and on that supposition the 
world would be eternal and yet created — 
which involves contradiction. 

If God created it freely and of his own 
choice merely, without any anterior reason 
for so doing, this would also involve a con- 
tradiction — for the supposition that a being 
infinitely wise created all things without any 
motive, and that a being infinitely powerful 
passed an eternity without making the least 
use of his power, is inconsistent with itself. 

Third Objection. 

If it appears to the greater part of man- 
kind that an intelligent being has stamped 
the impress of wisdom upon all nature, so 



48 VOLTAIRE. 

that every thing seems to have been made 
for some specific end ; it is yet more true 
that in the eyes of philosophers all the oper- 
ations of nature are carried on by the eter- 
nal, independent, and unchangeable laws 
of mathematics ; the structure and duration 
of the human frame, for example, being re- 
sults of the equilibrium of fluids and the 
force of levers. The more we discover of 
the mechanism of the universe, the more do 
we find it arranged, from the heavenly bodies 
to the worm, in conformity with mathemat- 
ical laws. We are authorized, therefore, to 
conclude that these laws, operating by their 
own nature, have necessarily produced ef- 
fects which are erroneously ascribed to the 
arbitrary determination of an intelligent 
power. A field, for instance, produces grass 
because such is the nature of its soil when 
moistened by the rain, and not because there 
are horses that require hay and oats for 
their subsistence : and the same reasoning 
may be applied to other things. 



VOLTAIRE. 49 

Fourth Objection. 

If the arrangement of the parts of the uni- 
verse and all that takes place among beings 
capable of thought and sensation prove the 
existence of a creator and ruler, still more 
do they prove that he is a cruel being ; for 
if we admit the doctrine of final causes we 
shall be obliged to say that God, the infi- 
nitely wise and infinitely good, conferred life 
on all his creatures in order that they might 
devour each other. In truth, when we turn 
our eyes upon the animal creation, we find 
that every species has an irresistible instinct 
prompting it to destroy some other species. 
We might pass our whole lives in address- 
ing reproaches to the Divinity on account of 
the misery suffered by man alone. It is in 
vain to tell us that God's wisdom and good- 
ness are not of the same character as ours. 
Such an argument will have no weight with 
multitudes of persons, who will reply that 
they can only judge of what is just by the 



50 VOLTAIRE. 

idea of justice which God is supposed to 
have given them ; that we can only mea- 
sure with the measure we have; and that it 
would be as impossible for us not to consider 
a being barbarous who should act like a 
barbarous man, as it is for us to avoid think- 
ing that any thing is six feet high when we 
have applied to it a measure two yards in 
length, and found that the measure and the 
thing measured appear to correspond. 

" If we are told," say they, " that our mea- 
sure is not correct, we are told what appar- 
ently contradicts itself; for it is God himself 
w T ho has given us this incorrect idea, and so 
God must have created us only to deceive 
us. Now it is a manifest inconsistency to 
assert that a being who is all perfection 
forces his creatures into error; error being, 
properly speaking, the only imperfection." 
Moreover, the materialists will say at last, 
"There are fewer absurdities in atheism 
than in deism; for in the former we must, 
indeed, conceive the world we behold to be 



VOLTAIRE. 51 

eternal and infinite — but in the latter we 
must suppose that another being is so, and 
to this supposition we must add that of the 
creation of the world, of which we can have 
no idea." They will contend, therefore, 
that there are fewer difficulties in not be- 
lieving in God than in believing. 



REPLY TO THE FOREGOING OBJECTIONS. 

The arguments against the creation have 
only the effect of showing that it is impossi- 
ble for us to conceive of it — that is to say, 
to conceive of the manner in which it took 
place. But they do not show that it was im- 
possible in itself; for before ihe impossibility 
of the creation can be proved, it is necessary 
to demonstrate the impossibility of the exist- 
ence of God. Far, however, from proving 
that impossibility, we are compelled to ad- 
mit the impossibility of his non-existence. 
The argument that there must exist, exter- 
nally to us, a being infinite, eternal, immeasu- 



52 VOLTAIRE. 

rable, omnipotent, free, intelligent, and the 
darkness by which this light is accompanied, 
serve only to make it manifest that there is 
such a light ; for by the very fact that the 
existence of an infinite being is established, 
the impossibility of his being comprehended 
by a finite being is also established. 

In my opinion, they who undertake to 
deny the necessity of a self-existent being, 
and they who maintain that matter is such 
a being, can do nothing more than frame 
sophisms and put forth absurdities.? His 
existence is proved, but the determination 
and discussion of his attributes is altogether 
a different matter. 

The masters of the art of reasoning, the 
Lockes and Clarkes, tell us, u This being 
must be intelligent; for he who has formed 
all that IS must possess all the perfections 
which he has imparted to what he has form- 
ed, otherwise the effect would be more per- 
fect than its cause :" or, in other w T ords, 
" There would be in the effect a perfection 



VOLTAIRE. 53 

produced by nothing — which is palpably 
absurd. Since, then, intelligent beings exist, 
and since matter could not bestow on itself 
the faculty of thought, the self-existent being, 
God, must be an intelligent being." 

But might not this argument be retorted 
thus : " God must be matter, because mate- 
rial beings exist ; for otherwise matter would 
have been produced by nothing, and a cause 
would have produced an effect the elements 
of which were not contained in that cause." 
Attempts have been made to elude this ar- 
gument by slipping in the word perfection. 
Clarke seems to have anticipated that the 
objection might be advanced against him ; 
but he has not ventured to state it in its full 
force. He presents only the following : " It 
will be said that God has imparted to matter 
divisibility and form, though he is himself 
without form and indivisible." And to this 
he opposes the very obvious and conclusive 
answer that form and divisibility are nega- 
tive qualities and limitations ; and that, 



54 VOLTAIRE. 

though a cause cannot communicate to its 
effect any perfection which it does not itself 
possess, yet the effect may and must necessa- 
rily have limitations and imperfections which 
are not found in the cause. But how would 
Clarke have replied to an opponent who 
should have urged such reasoning as the fol- 
lowing : " Matter is not a negative thing, a 
limitation, an imperfection. It is something 
real and positive, which has its attributes as 
much as spirit. Now how can God have 
produced a material being, if he, God, is not 
material V J You are thus driven to confess 
either that a cause can communicate some-, 
thing positive of which it is itself destitute, 
or that matter has no cause for its exist-, 
ence ; or else to contend that matter is a 
pure negation and limitation : or, if these 
three positions are considered untenable, 
you are constrained to admit that the ex- 
istence of intelligent beings no more proves 
that the self-existent being is intelligent, 
than the existence of material beings proves 



VOLTAIRE. 55 

that the self-existent being is material ; for 
the cases are completely parallel. The 
same thing may be said of motion. The 
use of the word perfection is here clearly an 

abuse. ^Who will undertake to assert that 

v 
matter is an imperfection and thought a per- 
fection ? I No one, I apprehend, will assume 
thus to decide in respect to the essence of 
things. Besides, what is the meaning of 
perfection^ Does it signify perfection rela- 
tively to God, or relatively to us % 

I know it may be said that this opinion 
would lead to the system of Spinoza. I 
might reply that I cannot help it, and that if 
my reasoning be sound, it cannot be render- 
ed unsound by any conclusion deduced from 
it. Still, nothing would be more unwar- 
ranted than any such deduction ; for what 
is said above tends merely to show that our 
intelligence no more resembles God's intelli- 
gence, than the mode in which we occupy a 
eertain portion of space resembles the man- 
ner in which space is filled by God. God 



56 VOLTAIRE. 

is not like the causes with which we are 
conversant. He was able to create spirit 
and matter, though himself neither spirit nor 
matter. Neither of the two is an emanation 
from him, but both were created by him. I 
do not know, indeed, quomodo. I prefer 
stopping short to going astray. I am fully 
convinced of God's existence, but am equally 
convinced that I am not capable of compre- 
hending his attributes and his essence. 

The assertion that God could not create 
the world either necessarily or by his own 
free will, is but a sophism which falls to the 
ground the moment we have proved that 
there is a God and that the world is not 
God. The objection resolves itself into this: 
" 1 cannot understand why God should have 
created the universe at one time rather than 
at another, and therefore he cannot have 
created it." It is as if one were to say, " I 
cannot understand why such and such a man 
or such and such a horse did not exist a 
thousand years earlier, and therefore it is 



VOLTAIRE. 57 

not possible that they do exist." Moreover, 
God's free will is a reason sufficient to ac- 
count for his creating the world at the time 
when it was created. If God. IS, he is free ; 
and he would not be so if he could only act 
when induced by a sufficient reason, and his 
own will were not such a reason. Besides, 
is this sufficient reason to be regarded as 
within him or without 1 On the latter hy- 
pothesis, he would not adopt his determi- 
nations freely ; on the former, what is the 
sufficient reason but his own will 1 

The laws of mathematics are unchange- 
able, it is true, but it was not necessary that 
some particular laws should be selected in 
preference to others. It was not necessary 
that the earth should be placed where it is. 
No mathematical law can act of itself. None 
does act where there is no movement ; and 
motion is not self-existent. We must have 
recourse, therefore, to a prime mover. I 
admit that the planets, placed at a certain 
distance from the sun, must pass through 
3* 



58 VOLTAIRE. 

their orbits in conformity with the laws 
which they do observe, and that their dis- 
tance may even be regulated by the quantity 
of matter they contain. But can it be affirm- 
ed that it was necessary that there should 
be a fixed quantity of matter in each planet ? 
— That there should be a fixed number of 
stars, which number could neither be increas- 
ed nor diminished 7 And is it required by 
an absolute necessity inherent in the very 
nature of things, that there should be on the 
earth a fixed number of beings 1 Unques- 
tionably not, for the number varies every 
day. (All nature, then, from the remotest 
star to a blade of grass, must be subject to 
a prime mover. 

As for the objection that the sustenance 
of cattle was not the essential object for 
which green fields were made, we have no 
right (even on the assumption that this is 
true) to infer that there is no final cause ; 
but ought only to conclude that there are 
some final causes with which we are unac- 



VOLTAIRE. 59 

quainted. Here we are especially bound to 
reason with fairness, and not seek to deceive 
ourselves. When we meet with any thing 
which always has the same effect — which 
has that effect only — and which is composed 
of an infinity of organs, in which an infinity 
of movements takes place, all concurring to 
the same result — we cannot, I think, with- 
out secret unwillingness, deny a final cause. 
Such is the fact in regard to the germs of all 
vegetables and all animals. Does it not re- 
quire some hardihood to affirm that all this 
has no relation to any end ? 

I grant that there is no demonstration, 
properly so called, that the stomach was in- 
tended as the instrument of digestion— just 
as there is no demonstration that the sun 
shines. But the materialists, too, are far 
from being able to demonstrate that the 
stomach was not designed to perform the 
function of digestion. I have only to ask 
that the decision as to which of these opin- 
ions is more likely to be correct, may be 



6Q VOLTAIRE. 

made as impartially as the decisions to which 
we come in the ordinary transactions of life. 

As to the charges of injustice and cruelty 
brought against God, I answer, first, that 
supposing moral evil to exist (though I 
believe the supposition that it does to be 
fallacious), it is no less impossible to explain 
it by the system of the materialists than by 
that in which a God is recognized. I reply, 
moreover, that we have no other ideas of 
justice than such as we have formed of every 
action which is useful to society and con- 
formable to the laws established by us for 
the public welfare. Now these ideas respect 
only the relations between man and man, 
and the analogy does not hold good in refer- 
ence to God. It is as absurd to say of God 
that he is just or unjust in this sense of the 
words, as to say that he is blue or square?) 

It is nonsense, therefore, to charge it upon 
God as a reproach, that flies are eaten by 
spiders — that the life of men in general does 
not exceed eighty years — that they make a 



VOLTAIRE. g] 

bad use of their free agency by destroying 
one another — that they are liable to diseases 
— subject to cruel passions, &c, &c. — for 
surely we do not imagine that men and flies 
ought to be immortal. Before asserting 
that a thing is bad, we should examine 
whether any thing better could be substitut- 
ed for it. We certainly cannot judge that a 
piece of machinery is imperfect, unless we 
have some idea of the perfection in which it 
is deficient ; we cannot judge that the three 
sides of a triangle are unequal, if we have 
no idea of an equilateral triangle ; we can- 
not say that a watch goes badly, unless we 
have a distinct idea of a certain number of 
equal spaces through which the hand of the 
watch must pass in equal times. But who 
can have an idea of the perfection, by its 
want of which the world, as now constituted, 
impeaches the divine wisdom 1 

There are difficulties in the doctrine that 
there is a God ; but in the opposite doctrine 
there are downright absurdities. Of these 



62 VOLTAIRE. 

I propose to offer some examples by sketch- 
ing a brief outline of what a materialist is 
obliged to believe. 



NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF THE OPINIONS OF 
THE MATERIALISTS. 

The materialists are compelled to main- 
tain that the world exists necessarily and of 
itself; so that for them it would be a contra- 
diction in terms to say that any particle of 
matter might not exist, or might exist other- 
wise than it does. They must hold that the 
material world includes in its own essence 
thought and feeling; for it cannot acquire 
them, since, in that case, it would receive 
them from nothing ; and as the material 
world itself is supposed to be all that IS, 
thought and feeling could not exist apart 
from it. Then they must be inherent in 
matter, like extension, divisibility, and the 



VOLTAIRE. 63 

capacity of being moved. At the same time, 
our opponents must allow that there is but a 
very small number of the parts of the world, 
in which thought and feeling are found, 
though they have contended that both are 
essential to the whole: and also that these 
thoughts and feelings, though inherent, as 
they declare, in matter, perish every moment : 
or else it will be necessary for them to main- 
tain that there is a Soul of the World, which 
diffuses itself throughout organized bodies ; 
and on that hypothesis, this soul must be 
something else than the world. Thus, on 
what side soever we turn, we meet with 
nothing but chimeras which destroy each 
other./ 

The materialists must hold, also, that mo- 
tion is essential to matter. Consequently, 
they are reduced to the necessity of affirm- 
ing that it has never been possible and never 
will be possible for motion either to increase 
or decrease. They will be forced to declare 
that a hundred thousand men marching at 



64 VOLTAIRE. 

once and the discharge of a hundred pieces 
of artillery occasion no new motion in nature. 
They must assert, likewise, that there is no 
free agency, thereby loosening all the bonds 
that bind society together, and must believe 
in a fatalism quite as difficult to be compre- 
hended as free agency, and which their own 
practice belies. 

Let the candid reader, after maturely 
weighing the arguments for and against the 
existence of a creating Deity, now determine 
on which side the probability lies. 



FROM THE "HENRIADE." 

Amidst a blaze of flame-like light, which pure and change- 
less shone, 

Was placed, ere time itself began, God's everlasting throne : 

The heavens are spread beneath his feet ; a thousand orbs 
proclaim, 

Rolling in one unvarying round, their great Creator's name. 



VOLTAIRE, 65 

Goodness and Wisdom, joined with Power, compose — mys- 
terious three 
Together blended, yet distinct — the Triune Deity.* 

* The original is as follows : 

Au milieu des clartes d'un feu pur et durable 
Dieu mit avant les temps son tr6ne inebranlable. 
Le ciel est sous ses pieds ; de mille astres divers 
Le cours toujours regie l'annonce a l'univers. 
La puissance, l'amour, avec Pintelligence ? 
Unis et divises composent son essence, 



END OF EXTRACTS FROM Y0LTAIR3L 



ROUSSEAU. 



ROUSSEAU. 



FROM "EMILE." 

{Profession de Foi du Vicaire Savoyard.) 
PART FIRST. 

I exist, and have senses ivhich exert an in- 
fluence upon me. This is the first truth by 
which I am struck, and to which I cannot 
but assent. Is the consciousness of my ex- 
istence a distinct feeling, or is it something 
at which I arrive by means of my sensations ? 
This is my first doubt, and one which I am 
as yet incompetent to resolve. For, being 
continually affected by sensations, either 
directly or indirectly through the mem- 



70 ROUSSEAU. 

ory, how can I tell whether the conviction 
of my own individuality be something apart 
from those sensations and independent of 
them, or not ? 

My sensations must be internal, for they 
make me aware of my existence ; but their 
cause must be external, or they would not 
affect me against my will, and without any 
ability on my part either to produce or pre- 
vent them. I am confident, therefore, that 
the sensations which are within me, and 
their cause or object which is not within me, 
cannot be one and the same thing. 

Not only do I exist, then, but there exist 
other beings, namely, the objects of my sen- 
sations; and even though those objects be 
nothing but ideas, still they are not myself. 

Now all the external objects with which I 
become acquainted by my senses and which 
act upon them, I call matter; and when I 
conceive of particles of matter combined so 
as to form individual beings, I call them 
bodies. Thus, all the disputes of the ideal- 



ROUSSEAU. 71 

ists and the materialists are unimportant to 
me ; their distinctions in relation to the ap- 
pearances and the realities of bodies are 
mere chimeras. 

Here, therefore, I am as certain of the 
existence of the universe as I am of my own. 
I then reflect on the objects of my sensations, 
and, finding that I have the faculty of com- 
paring them, I feel that I am endowed with 
an active power which I was not before 
conscious of possessing. 

To perceive is to discover by sensation. 
To compare is to judge of the properties or 
proportions of things. There is a difference 
between discovering things by sensation and 
judging of their properties or proportions. 
By sensation objects present themselves be- 
fore me, separately, one by one, and as na- 
ture offers them. By comparison, I put these 
objects in motion, transport them, so to speak, 
from their places, and set them one upon 
another, in order to ascertain their similarity 
or dissimilarity and the general relations in 
which they stand to each other. The ability 



72 ROUSSEAU. 

to attach a meaning to the word IS, consti- 
tutes in my opinion the distinctive charac- 
teristic of an active and intelligent being. 
In a being purely sensitive, I seek in vain for 
that intelligent faculty which brings ob- 
jects together and then decides upon them. 
The nature of such a being does not seem to 
admit of the faculty. A being of this char- 
acter may perceive every single object 
when unconnected with others, or even a 
whole composed of two—but destitute as 
it is, of the capacity of bringing them 
into contact with each other, it can never 
{ compare them, or determine their relative 
properties. 

To see two things at the same time does 
not necessarily imply an examination of their 
relations or the formation of a conclusion as 
to the points in which they differ. Simply 
to perceive a number of separate things is 
not to count them. I may think at the same 
moment of a small stick and of a large one, 
without comparing them, without reflecting 
that one is inferior in size to the other — just 



ROUSSEAU. 73 

as I can look at my hand without consider- 
ing how many fingers it has.* The ideas of 
comparison, represented by the expressions 
greater than and less than, as well as the 
ideas of number indicated by the words one, 
two, &c, certainly are not sensations, though 
they only occur to my mind when my sen- 
sations suggest them. 

It has been said that the sensations of a 
sensitive being are distinguished from one 
another by the differences between them. 
This requires explanation. When the sen- 
sations are different, it is by their differences 
that the sensitive being distinguishes them ; 
when they are similar, they are distinguish- 
ed by their independence of each other. 
Otherwise, when two objects, which are 
equal to each other, produce simultaneous 



* M. de La Condamine (in his Travels) speaks of a peo- 
ple who could only count as far as three. Yet the individu- 
als of whom the nation was composed must have often per- 
ceived the five fingers on each of their hands, though without 
knowing what was the number, 
4 



74 ROUSSEAU. 

sensations, how would it be possible to 
distinguish them 7 The two things would 
inevitably be confounded, and be supposed 
to be one only, especially on the supposition 
that the sensations indicating extension have 
no extension themselves. 

When the two sensations to be compared 
have been felt, their impression is made — 
each object has been rendered sensible to 
us — the two together are rendered sensible; 
but it does not follow from this that their 
relations to each other are so. If my con- 
clusions in respect to these relations were 
mere sensations, and were derived solely 
from the objects, they would never deceive 
me, since it can never be untrue that I feel 
what I feel. 

Why, then, am I deceived in regard to the 
relations between these two sticks, especial- 
ly when they are not parallel ? Why do I 
say, for instance, that the small stick is one 
third the size of the large, when, in reality, it 
is only one fourth ? Why does not the im- 



ROUSSEAU. 75 

age — the sensation — correspond to its model, 
the object? It is because I act when I am 
drawing my conclusions. The error takes 
place in the operation of comparison, and 
my understanding in deciding intermixes its 
own mistakes with the truth of the sensa- 
tions. The latter show only the two objects 
as they are. 

There is another consideration which I 
am sure will appear striking when you re- 
flect upon it. It is this, that if we were 
purely passive in the use of our senses, there 
would be no intercommunication between 
them. It would be impossible to know 
that the body we touch and the object 
we see are one and the same. Either 
we should never perceive any thing ex- 
ternal to us, or whatever affects our 
five senses would seem to be fixe different 
things, and we should have no means of 
learning their identity. 

Whatever name may be bestowed on that 
faculty of my mind which brings together 



76 ROUSSEAU. 

and compares my sensations — * whether 
it be denoted by the term attention, medi- 
tation, reflection, or by any other appel- 
lation — it is not the less something in 
me, and not in outward objects; something 
which I- alone call into exercise, though 
I do so only under the influence of the 
impression made upon me by outward ob- 
jects. I cannot at will experience or 
avoid experiencing the sensation, but 
I can determine for myself whether I will 
examine it, when experienced, with more 
or less attention. 

I am not, therefore, merely a sensitive and 
passive, but am likewise an active and in- 
telligent being ; and, whatever philosophers 
may maintain, I shall venture to aspire even 
to the honor of thinking , (i know only that 
truth is in things and not in the opinions 
which J may have of them; and that the 
less I mingle of what appertains to myself 
in the conclusions to which I come, the great- 
er is the certainty of my approaching truth. 



ROUSSEAU. 77 

Hence the rule which I have adopted, of be- 
ing guided rather by my feelings than by my 
reason, is confirmed by reason itself. 

Having, if I may so speak, made sure of 
myself, I begin to look abroad ; and it is with 
a sort of shuddering that I find myself cast 
forth and lost in the vast universe in which 
I am placed — merged, as it were, in the 
immensity of beings, without knowing what 
they are, whether considered in reference to 
each other or to me. I study and observe 
them, and the first object which presents it- 
self as a standard of comparison, is myself. 

All that I discern by my senses is matter ; 
and I deduce all the essential properties of 
matter from the sensible qualities by which 
I am enabled to discern it. I see it some- 
times in motion, and sometimes at rest; 
whence I infer that neither motion nor rest 
is essential to it, but that motion (being an 
action) is the effect of a. cause, and that rest 
is merely the absence of that cause. When, 
therefore, there is nothing which acts upon 



78 ROUSSEAU. 

matter it does not move ; and hence, from 
the very fact that rest or motion is indifferent 
to it, its natural state may be affirmed to be 
rest. 

I perceive in bodies two kinds of motion, 
namely, that which is communicated from 
without, and that which is spontaneous or 
voluntary. In the former, the moving cause 
is foreign to the body moved. In the latter, 
the cause is in the body. I shall not draw 
from this the conclusion that the motion of 
a watch, for instance, is spontaneous ; for if 
the spring were not acted upon by some for- 
eign force, it would have no tendency to re- 
coil, and would not pull upon the chain. For 
the same reason, I cannot admit that the 
motion of fluids is spontaneous, nor even that 
such is the case with the phlogiston from 
which their fluidity proceeds. 

You may ask whether the movements of 
animals are spontaneous. I reply that I am 
unable to say, but that analogy would lead 
to an affirmative conclusion. You will per- 



ROUSSEAU. 79 

haps inquire how I know that any motion 
is spontaneous. I can only answer that my 
knowledge on this point is derived from what 
I feel. I will that my arm should move, 
and it does move in obedience to my volition/^ 
Any attempt to destroy this feeling by argu- 
ment is futile. There is no other species of 
evidence so strong ; and I might with as 
much reason be told that I do not exist. 

If there were no spontaneousness in the 
actions of men, nor in any thing which occurs 
on earth, we should be only the more em- 
barrassed in endeavoring to ascertain the 
primary cause of every motion. For myself, 
I am so firmly convinced that matter in its 
natural state is at rest and has no power to 
act of itself, that when I see a body in mo- 
tion, I suppose at once either that it is alive, 
or that the movement has been impressed 
upon it from without. (I cannot concur in 
the idea that inorganic matter can, of itself, 
move or produce any actiom 

Yet the visible universe is matter— matter 



g0 ROUSSEAU. 

in a state of dispersion and lifeless — destitute 
of union and organization, and destitute also 
of that community of feeling which distin- 
guishes the parts of an animated body ; for 
we, who are parts of the universe, do not 
feel ourselves affected by whatever affects 
any other part. This universe is in motion ; 
and its movements are regular, uniform, sub- 
ject to unchanging laws, and give no signs 
of that liberty by which the movements of 
men and animals are characterized. The 
world, then, is not a huge animal moving of 
its own accord. Its movements have some 
extraneous cause, and though I cannot per- 
ceive what it is, my internal convictions of 
its existence are so strong that I never look 
upon the sun apparently revolving round 
the earth, without thinking on the force 
which impels it ; nor remember that the 
earth is turning on its axis, without imag- 
ining that I can see the hand by which it is 
kept in motion. 

To assert that these movements are the 



ROUSSEAU. 81 

result of certain general laws, which, so far 
as I can discover, have no essential connec- 
tion with matter, is to offer an explanation 
altogether unsatisfactory. These laws are 
not actual beings or substances, and must 
consequently have some source which is un- 
known to me) 

By experience and observation we learn 
what the laws of motion are, and are thus 
enabled to calculate effects, but we derive 
from our knowledge of these no power of 
determining causes. These laws are totally 
inadequate to account for the system of the 
world and the movement of the universe. 
(Descartes constructed the heavens and the 
earth with dice, but he did not succeed in 
setting them in motion, and could only make 
his centrifugal force operate by means of a 
rotary movement. Newton discovered the 
law of gravitation. But gravitation alone 
would speedily convert the universe into a 
stationary mass, and it was indispensable 

that the theory of a projectile force should 

4* 



32 ROUSSEAU. 

be added in order to explain the curves 
described by the heavenly bodies. Let 
Descartes inform us what law of physics 
compels his vortices to whirl ; let Newton 
show the hand which launched the planets 
in tangents to their orbits ! 

The first causes of motion are not inherent 
in matter — the latter receives and imparts, 
but does not originate the former. The 
more I observe how the forces of nature act 
and react upon each other, the more clearly 
do I see that as we ascend through a long 
succession of effects resulting from preceding 
effects, we are always obliged to recognize 
some WILL as the first cause ; for to suppose 
an infinite series of causes is tantamount to 
supposing no cause at all. In a word, every 
movement not the product of another move- 
ment can only arise from some spontaneous, 
voluntary act. The only act of inanimate 
bodies is movement ; and since there can be, 
as I have already remarked, no real action 
without volition, the movements of these 



ROUSSEAU. 33 

bodies must be the consequence of volition. 
This is my first principle. I believe, then, 
that some WILL moves the universe and 
animates nature. This is my first Doctrinal 
Point or Article of Faith. 

Am I asked, how a mere exercise of vo- 
lition can occasion a physical and corporeal 
act? I do not know in ichat icay this takes 
place, but I know from my own experience 
that it does take place. If I will to perform 
an act, I perform it ; if I will that my body 
should move, it moves ; but that an inani- 
mate body should, of itself, either move or 
produce motion is incomprehensible, and no 
instance of such an occurrence can be cited. 
The will is known by its acts, not by its 
nature. I recognize it as the source of 
motion, but to conceive matter to be so, 
is evidently to conceive of an effect without 
a cause — which is the same as to have no 
conception whatever. 

It is no more possible for me to understand 
in what manner my will occasions a move- 



g4 ROUSSEAU. 

ment of my body, than it is to understand in 
what manner my sensations affect my soul. 
I know not for what reason one of these mys- 
teries has been considered more susceptible 
of explanation than the other. To me, the 
means by which the two substances are unit- 
ed appear beyond comprehension, both when 
I am active and when I am passive. It is 
extremely singular that this very incompre- 
hensibility has been made the ground on 
which the two substances have been con- 
founded together; as if processes so dissim- 
ilar could be more easily accounted for when 
viewed as the work of a single agent, than 
when regarded as that of two. 

The Doctrinal Point which I have just 
laid down is obscure, I admit. Yet it has a 
meaning, and involves nothing repugnant to 
reason and observation. Can as much be 
said for materialism ? If motion were an 
essential property of matter, is it not obvious 
that the former would always be found in 
connection with the latter — would always 



ROUSSEAU. 85 

belong to it in an equal degree — would be 
always the same in each individual particle 
of it — would be incapable of passing from 
one body to another — would be incapable 
also of increase or diminution ; — and that 
we should be unable to conceive of matter 
at rest ? They who maintain that motion 
is not one of its essential, but only one of its 
necessary properties, endeavor to mislead by 
words which could be more easily refuted if 
they were not so deficient in sense. For, 
either movement proceeds from matter itself, 
in which case it is essential to matter; or 
it proceeds from a foreign cause, and in that 
case is only necessary so far forth as the 
moving cause acts upon matter ; and we are 
thus carried back to the difficulty before 
stated. 

\General and abstract ideas have been the 
springs from which the greatest of human 
errors have flowed.) The jargon of meta- 
physics has never led to the discovery of a 
single truth, and it has filled philosophy with 



Q6 ROUSSEAU. 

absurdities of which we are ashamed as 
soon as we strip them of their high-sound- 
ing names?) When you are told, my friend, 
of a blind energy diffused through all nature, 
do the words convey to your mind any thing 
deserving to be called an idea ? (They who 
make use of such unmeaning terms as uni- 
versal force, necessary motion, imagine they 
are uttering something extremely profound, 
while in reality their language signifies no- 
thing. The idea of motion is merely that of 
transportation from one place to another. 
There can be no motion which does not tend 
iu some direction, for an individual being 
cannot move in all directions at once. In 
what direction, then, does matter necessarily 
move 1 Has all matter, viewed as one body, 
a uniform movement, or has every atom its 
own peculiar movement ? On the former 
supposition, the universe would constitute 
one solid and indivisible mass ; on the latter, 
it would form only a scattered and incohe- 
rent fluid, and the union of any two atoms 



ROUSSEAU. 37 

would be forever impossible. In what di- 
rection does this common movement of mat- 
ter take place — in a straight line or a circle, 
upward or downward, to the right or to the 
left 1 If every molecule has its own partic- 
ular movement, what can be the causes of 
these directions and differences 1 If every 
atom or molecule only turned on its centre, 
nothing would ever quit its first position, 
and there would be no transmission of mo- 
tion ; and even the circular motion alluded 
to would, in fact, be motion in a fixed direc- 
tion. To ascribe to matter movement in the 
abstract, is to employ language which has 
no intelligible signification ; and to ascribe 
to it a determinate movement is to imply a 
cause by which the movement is determined. 
The more I multiply forces, the greater be- 
comes the number of new causes which I 
have to account for, and I can find no com- 
mon agent to direct them. So far am I from 
being able to imagine any order as the re- 
sult of a fortuitous concourse of atoms, that 



gg ROUSSEAU. 

I cannot even imagine any collision between 
those atoms; and the chaos of the universe 
would be more incomprehensible than its 
harmony. \JThat the mechanism of the world 
may be unintelligible to the human mind, 
I can well conceive ; but he who undertakes 
to explain it, should speak so as to be 
understood. 

\Jf matter in motion indicates a will, matter 
moving in accordance with determinate laws 
indicates an intelligence. This is my second 
Article of Faith. Acting, comparing, and se- 
lecting are operations which mark an active 
and thinking being: then such a being exists. 
You will perhaps inquire where I behold him. 
I Not only do I behold him in the revolving 
heavens, in the star which gives us light, and 
in my own frame, but also in the browsing 
sheep, in the flying bird, in the falling stone, 
in the leaf blown along by the wind?) 

I can judge of the order of the world, al- 
though I am ignorant of the end which it 
was intended to subserve, because for the pur- 



ROUSSEAU. 89 

pose of so judging, it is only necessary that 
I should compare the parts together, study 
their cooperation and relations, and observe 
how they harmonize with one another. I 
know not why the universe exists, but that 
does not prevent me from seeing how it is 
regulated, nor from perceiving the nice adap- 
tation by which the beings that compose it 
afford aid to each other. I am in the situa- 
tion of a man who should look for the first 
time in his life at the works of a watch. He 
would admire the workmanship, even though 
he were unacquainted with the use of the 
instrument and did not see the dial. I do 
not know, he would say, what all this is for, 
but it is evident that every part was made 
with reference to the other parts; I admire 
the mechanical skill displayed in the details, 
and I am very sure that all these wheels do 
not turn in such exact concert without some 
common object which I cannot ascertain by 
mere inspection. 

Let us compare the particular ends, the 



90 ROUSSEAU. 

means by which those ends are attained, the 
relations subsisting between the different 
species of things, and then hearken to the 
dictates of our feelings, and what sound 
mind can refuse to yield to their testimony ! 
LWhere are the eyes not blinded by prejudice, 
to which the visible order of the universe 
does not disclose a Supreme Intelligence ! 
And to what sophistry are we not obliged 
to have recourse when we refuse to recog- 
nize the harmony of creation and the admi- 
rable adaptation of the structure of all the 
parts to the preservation of the other parts! 
Prate as much as you please of combinations 
and chances — what do you gain by out-talk- 
ing me, so long as you cannot convince me? 
And how will you destroy the involuntary 
conviction which, in spite of all my efforts, 
rises within me, that you are in the wrong?) 
^ If organized bodies were fortuitously com- 
bined in a thousand ways before assuming 
a regular form ; if, for example, there were 
stomachs, but no mouths, feet, but no heads, 



ROUSSEAU. 91 

hands without arms, and imperfect organs of 
all kinds, which perished, not from any ex- 
ternal violence, but from mere absence of 
the means of self- conservation — how hap- 
pens it that none of these shapeless produc- 
tions offer themselves to our view at the 
present time ? How happens it that nature 
has prescribed to herself laws by which she 
was not originally controlled ? When in any 
undertaking the number of trials which may 
be made is so great as to counterbalance in 
some measure the difficulty of the attempt, 
so that one instance of success may take 
place, though accompanied by a multitude 
of failures — under such circumstances, I have 
no reason for astonishment if the event desir- 
ed (which is possible, however improbable) 
should occur. Yet if I were told that the 
types of a printer* had been thrown on the 



* Rousseau has borrowed this illustration from Cicero : 
" Hie ego non mirer esse quemquam, qui sibi persuadeat, 
corpora qu«dam solida, atque individua, vi et gravitate ferri, 
mundumque effici ornatissimum, et pulcherrimum ex eorum 




92 ROUSSEAU. 

ground at random, and had, by sheer acci- 
dent fallen in such an order as to give the 
exact words of Virgil's JEneid, the improb- 
ability would be such that I would not take 
the trouble of a single step for the purpose 
of obtaining ocular demonstration of the 
falsehood of the assertion. In vain mi^ht it 



corporum concursione fortuita 7 Hoc qui existimat fieri potu- 
isse, non intelligo cur non idem putet, siinnumerabilesunius 
et viginti formse literarum vel aurea:, vel quales libet, aliquo 
conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis annales Ennii, 
ut deinceps legi possint effici: quod nescio an ne in uno qui- 
dem versupossittantum valere fortuna." — Cicero, {De Nat. 
Deorum, Lib. ii, 37.) 

How can I fail to be astonished that any one should 
succeed in persuading himself that certain solid and indivisi- 
ble bodies were put in motion by their own force and weight, 
and that the world, with all its splendor and beauty, was 
produced by the fortuitous concourse of these bodies ? I see 
not why a man who believes the possibility of this, should 
not believe also that if a great number of copies of the twen- 
ty-one letters of the alphabet, made of gold or any other ma- 
terial, were to be thrown down together in any place, they 
might fall upon the ground in such a manner as to form the 
Annals of Ennius, complete. Yet I doubt whether accident 
could cause even a single verse to be formed in this way." 

How nearly had Cicero approached to the invention of 
the art of printing ! Translator. 



ROUSSEAU. 93 

be said that I had not considered the number 
of trials which were made before the exper- 
iment proved successful. How many trials 
would be required to render such a combi- 
nation probable! I can discover but one 
chance in its favor, while there would be an 
infinity of chances that the combination was 
not the effect of accident. Besides, the 
product of combinations and chances must 
be of the same nature as the elements on 
which they operate; so that organization 
and life cannot result from any mere union 
of atoms?) A chemist, combining different in- 
gredients in his crucible, cannot endow them 
with sensation and thought.* 

* Would any one have supposed that human extrava- 
gance could be carried to such a length ? Amatus Lusitanus 
declares that he saw a little man an inch long, enclosed in a 
glass case, whom Julius Camillus.like a second Prometheus, 
had created by means of Alchymy. Paracelsus, in his trea- 
tise De Natara Rerum, informs us how these little men may 
be made, and maintains that the pigmies, fauns, satyrs, and 
nymphs were engendered by chemical processes. ■ . 

In point of fact, 1 cannot discover that there is any thing 
wanting to prove the possibility of the truth of these asser- 



94 ROUSSEAU. 

I was surprised and almost scandalized in 
reading the work of Nieuwentyt. How could 
the man think of composing a book describ- 
ing such of the wonders of nature as exhibit 
the wisdom of nature's Author ? Had his 
book been as large as the world itself, the 
subject would not have been exhausted ; and 
as soon as we descend to the details, the 
greatest wonder of all, viz., the harmony and 
cooperation of the whole, escapes. (The mind 
of man cannot fathom even the mystery of 
the generation of living and organized bodies/? 
The insurmountable barrier which nature 
has interposed between their different spe- 
cies, in order that they might not be con- 
founded together, is irrefragable proof of her 
intentions. She has not contented herself 
with establishing order, but has resorted to 



tions, except some evidence to show that organized bodies 
are not affected by fire, and that the particles of which they 
are composed can retain their vitality in a reverberatory 
furnace ! 



ROUSSEAU. 95 

effectual measures to secure it from all 
disturbance. 

,-There is not in the universe a being that 
may not in some respects be viewed as the 
common centre around which all are arrang- 
ed ; so that all are reciprocally ends and 
means in regard to each other. The mind 
is confused and lost in this infinity of mutual 
relations, not one of which is itself confused 
or lost in the complexity of all. In opposi- 
tion to all this harmony, how preposterous 
is the idea that matter is but a piece of 
mechanism blindly constructed, and fortui- 
tously set in motion ! They who deny the 
unity of design manifested in the relations 
between all the parts of the great whole, 
seek vainly to conceal their absurdities un- 
der the name of abstractions, co-ordinations, 
general principles, and under figurative ex- 
pressions. Say what they may, I cannot 
conceive of so regularly arranged a system 
without at the same time conceiving of an 



96 ROUSSEAU. 

intelligence by which it is arranged) I 
cannot believe that matter, passive and life- 
less as it is, is able to produce living and 
sentient beings; that blind fatality is able 
to produce intelligent beings; or that what 
is itself incapable of thought is able to pro- 
duce thinking beings; 

I believe, then, that the world is governed 
by a Will which is both powerful and wise) 
I see and feel that this is the case, and the 
knowledge that it is so is of great importance 
to me. But has the world existed from all 
eternity, or was it created? Is there one 
Principle of Things only 1 Or are there two 
or more 1 and if so, what is their nature? 
These are subjects of which I am entirely 
ignorant, and which do not in the least con- 
cern me. In proportion as the knowledge 
of them shall become interesting to me, I will 
endeavor to acquire it : till then, I shall ab- 
stain from the examination of idle questions 
which my pride may urge me to attempt to 






ROUSSEAU. Qfl 

solve, but which can have no influence on my 
conduct and are beyond the reach of my 
reason?) 

Recollect that I am not inculcating my 
opinions, but am merely stating them. 
Whether matter be eternal or created, 
whether there be or be not a passive prin- 
ciple, it is certain that the whole is^oNE^ and 
announces one Intelligence; for I find noth- 
ing which is not in conformity with the same 
system, or which does not contribute to the 
same end, to wit, the maintenance of the 
whole in the established order. The being 
whose will and power are co-extensive, 
whose acts proceed only from himself, who 
moves the universe and governs all things — 
that Being, whatever be his nature, I call 
/God. I attach to this name the attributes 
of intelligence, power, will (of which I have 
already spoken), andthatof goodness, which 
is necessarily inferred from the preceding. 
But I have not on that account any addition- 
al knowledge of the being to whom I have 



9g ROUSSEAU. 

ascribed this attribute. He is equally above 
the sphere of my senses and my understand- 
ing. The more I meditate upon him the 
more I am confounded. I know with per- 
fect certainty that he exists, and that he is 
self-existent; I know that my existence is 
subordinate to his ; and that whatever comes 
within the scope of my observation is in the 
same condition. \ I perceive God every where 
in his works ; I feel him within me ; I see 
him all around me ; but the moment I strive 
to contemplate him in himself — the moment 
I seek to learn where he is, what he is, what 
is his essence — he escapes my search, and 
my agitated mind can grasp nothing^ 

PART SECOND, 

^^-^Satisfied of my own incapacity, I will 
never undertake to reason on the nature of 
God, except in so far as concerns his relations 
to me. Such reasonings are always rash, 
and a wise man will tremble when he at- 



ROUSSEAU. 99 

tempts them, and feel assured that he is not 
destined to master the subject: for not to 
think on the Deity at all is far less repre- 
hensible than to think evil of him. 
^After discovering such of his attributes as 
enable me to conceive of his existence, I re- 
turn to myself, and endeavor by all the means 
at my command to ascertain what rank I 
hold in the order of things which he con- 
trols. I find that, so far as regards my spe- 
cies, I occupy beyond question the highest 
grade, for by my will and the instruments by 
which I can execute it, I act on all the bod- 
ies which surround me, and subject myself 
to or withdraw myself from their action, 
more easily and forcibly that any of these 
can act upon me by mere physical impulsion; 
and with respect to intelligence, none but 
myself is capable of taking a survey of the 
whole. What being on earth, other than 
man, possesses the power of observing all 
the rest — of measuring, calculating, foresee- 
ing their movements, their effects — and of 



100 ROUSSEAU. 

uniting, so to speak, the consciousness of the 
general existence with that of his own indi- 
vidual existence 1 (What is there so ridicu- 
lous in believing that all is made for me, 
when I alone have the ability to comprehend 
that all is connected with me 2 
^-Jt is true, therefore, that man is the mon- 
arch of the earth on which he dwells, inas- 
much as he not only subdues ail animals and 
disposes of the elements by his industry 
(while no other being on the earth is capable 
of so much as understanding the processes to 
which he resorts for that purpose), but by 
the force of his intellect he makes the stars 
themselves, though unapproachable, his own. 
Show me any other animal that is acquaint- 
ed with the use of fire, or admires the sun ! 
What ! Must I — endowed, as I am, with 
the faculty of observing and acquiring the 
knowledge of all existing things and their 
relations — J, who know what order, beauty, 
virtue signify — who have the power of con- 
templating the universe, of rising in thought 



ROUSSEAU. 101 

up to the hand that rules it, and of loving 
and practising goodness — must I compare 
myself to brutes? Abject spirit! it is thy 
pernicious philosophy which renders thee 
like them ; or, rather, thou strivest in vain 
to debase thyself; thy genius testifies against 
thy principles ; thy benevolent heart belies 
thy theories ; and the very abuse of thy 
faculties proves their excellence in spite of 
thee ! 

For myself, as a plain and candid man — 
as one who has no system to advocate, whom 
no madness of party impels, and who aspires 
not to the honor of figuring as the leader of 
a sect — content with the situation which 
God has assigned me, I see nothing except 
him which seems superior to my own race ; 
and if I were at liberty to select my place 
in the scale of being, what more could I 
choose than to be a man ? 

This reflection awakens within me grati- 
tude rather than pride : for it was not 
my election which determined my place. 



102 ROUSSEAU. 

nor could any merit of mine have entitled 
me to it, inasmuch as it was fixed before I 
came into existence. iHow, then, can I see 
myself so favored without self-congratulation 
on the honorable rank I occupy, or without 
blessing the hand to which I am indebted 
for itfl My first examination of my own 
nature gives rise in my heart to sentiments 
of thankfulness and grateful acknowledg- 
ment to the Creator of the race to which I 
belong, and from these sentiments proceeds 
my first offering of homage to the beneficent 
Divinity. I adore the Supreme Powder, and 
am filled with tender emotions in view of 
the benefits which he confers. I need no 
one to teach me this religion ; it is dictated 
by nature herself. \Is it not a natural result 
of our love for ourselves that we should 
honor that which protects us, and love that 
which desires to promote our welfare]? 

But when, with the view of ascertaining 
my individual place among my species, I 
turn my attention to the various classes of 



ROUSSEAU. 1Q3 

men and to the particular individuals who 
compose them, what then becomes of me ? 
What a spectacle is here presented ! Where 
is the order which I had before remarked % 
The picture offered to our gaze by nature 
exhibits only harmony and proportion : (in 
that displayed by the human race, we wit- 
ness nothing but confusion and disorder.) 
The elements act in concert, but chaos 
reigns among men ! The animals are happy ; 
their king alone is wretched ! Oh, Wisdom, 
where are thy laws ? Oh, Providence, is it 
thus thou ffovernest the world ? Beneficent 
Being, where is thy power ?< I behold evil 

ON THE EARTH ! 

(Would you have supposed it, my friend ? — 
these gloomy reflections and seeming incon- 
sistencies first suggested to my mind ideas 
respecting the soul, more sublime than any 
which my researches had before led me to 
form. While meditating on the nature of 
man, I imagined I could discover two dis- 
tinct principles, one of which impels him to 



104 



ROUSSEAU. 



the study of eternal truth, to the love of jus- 
tice and moral beauty, elevating him to those 
regions of the intellectual world the contem- 
plation of which constitutes the delight of 
the sage ; while the other draws back his 
thoughts and prevents them from rising high- 
er than himself, making him the slave of his 
senses and of the passions which are their 
ministers, and thus endeavoring to neutralize 
the operation of the opposing principle upon 
hinO Finding myself assailed and urged in 
different directions by these two contending 
impulses, I said to myself, No ; man is not 
one : I will and do not w T ill ; I feel myself 
enslaved and free at the same moment ; I 
see the Right, I desire to act in accordance 
with it, and nevertheless I pursue the Wrong y 
(j am active when I listen to my reason, pas- 
sive when governed by my passions; and my 
greatest misfortune, when I have yielded to 
the latter, is the consciousness that I might 
have resisted them) 

My young friend, you may give me your 



ROUSSEAU. 105 

confidence ; whatever I say shall at least be 
said in sincerity. If conscience is but the 
creature of our prejudices, I am of course in 
error, and there is nothing from which the 
principles of morality can be demonstrated. 
But if to be more solicitous for ourselves than 
for aught else be our natural disposition, 
and if, nevertheless, the elementary notions 
of justice are innate in the human heart; 
when they who contend that the constitu- 
tion of man is simple and uncompounded 
shall have reconciled these contradictions, I 
will admit that we are formed of but one 
substance. 

Observe that by the word substance I 
mean, in general, a being possessing some 
primary quality, without reference to any 
special or secondary modification of it. If, 
therefore, all the primary qualities known to 
us can be combined in a single being, we 
are at liberty to conclude that there is but 
one substance; but if there are qualities in- 
compatible with each other, there must be 
5# 



106 ROUSSEAU. 

as many different substances as there are 
cases in which such incompatibility exists. 
This is a point on which you should reflect. 
For myself, whateverXocke may maintain, I 
have only to know that matter is susceptible 
of extension and division, to be convinced 
that it is not capable of thought ; and 
though a philosopher should come to me and 
affirm that trees feel and rocks think, and 
should embarrass me by the subtlety of his 
arguments, yet I should look upon him only 
as a disingenuous sophist who would rather 
ascribe sensation to stones than allow that 
man has a soul. 

Suppose a deaf man were to deny the 
reality of sounds, because his own ear had 
never been affected by them. Suppose I 
should place before him a stringed instrument 
of music, and the strings of another instru- 
ment in unison with the former, but conceal- 
ed from sight, should be made to vibrate. I 
might say to the deaf man, who would see 
the tremulous movement of the string, " It 



ROUSSEAU. 107 

is the sound which produces that." " Not 
at all," he would perhaps reply; " the cause 
of the string's vibration is in itself; such vi- 
brations are common to all bodies." " Show 
me, then." I would say, " other bodies in 
which the vibration takes place, or, at all 
events, point out the cause of it in this string." 
" I cannot," he might answer, " but it does 
not follow that because I do not understand 
how it is that the string vibrates, I must 
seek to explain the difficulty by recurring to 
your sounds, of which I have not the least 
conception. That would be explaining an 
obscure effect by a cause still more obscure. 
Either render your sounds sensible to me, or 
I shall say that they do not exist." 

The more I reflect on thought itself, and 
on the constitution of the human mind, the 
more does the reasoning of the materialists 
seem to me to resemble that of the deaf man. 
They are, in truth, deaf to that inward voice 
which cries in tones which it is difficult to 
leave unheeded: — f Machines do not think : 



108 ROUSSEAU. 

there is no motion nor any form by which re- 
flection is generated. There is something 
within thee that strives to break the bonds 
by which it is confined : space itself cannot 
contain thee; the universe is too contracted 
for thee; thy sentiments, thy desires, thy 
restlessness, thy very pride, proceed from 
another principle than that diminutive body 
in which thou feelest thyself imprisoned." 

No merely material being is active of itself. 
I am so. It is in vain to deny this. I know 
it by my own feelings, which have more 
weight with me than any opposing argu- 
ments. I have a body which acts upon other 
bodies and is acted upon by them. This re- 
ciprocal action is not a matter of doubt. But 
my will is independent of my senses ; I can 
comply or resist, I can yield to or triumph 
over them ; and am perfectly aware when I 
have acted in accordance with my will, and 
when in obedience to my passions. I am 
always capable of exercising my will, but 
not always of carrying it into execution. 



ROUSSEAU. 109 

When I give way to temptation, I act under 
the influence of external objects; when I 
reproach myself with my weakness, I listen 
to my will. (The vices into which I fall 
render me a slave ; my remorse for them 
proves that I am free*. The consciousness 
of my freedom is absent only when I cease 
to be virtuous, and stifle the voice of the soul 
which cries out against the propensities of 
the bodyJ 

All my knowledge of volition is derived 
from my own ; and I am equally ignorant 
of the nature of the understanding. If it be 
asked what is the cause which determines my 
will, I reply by inquiring, what is the cause 
which determines my judgment 1 — for it is 
plain that these two causes are in fact the 
same. If we are satisfied that man is active 
in judging, that his understanding is nothing 
else than the power of comparing and de- 
ciding, we shall see that his free will is a 
faculty similar to this, or derived from it. His 
choice as to what is good, is like his judg- 



HO ROUSSEAU. 

ment as to what is true ; when his conclu- 
sions are false, his choice is bad. What 
then is the cause which determines his will? 
It is his judgment. And what is the cause 
which determines his judgment? It is his 
faculty of intelligence*-his jiower of judging. 
The determining cause is in himself. Far- 
ther than this, my knowledge does not extend. 
Doubtless I am not free not to will my 
own happiness ; I am not free to will my 
own misery ; but my freedom of will consists 
in the very fact that I can will only what is 
for my own advantage, or what appears to 
me to be so ; and that no cause foreign to 
myself determines what I must will. Does 
it follow that I am not my own master, be- 
cause I cannot be other than what I am? 
The principle of every action is the will of a 
free being. We can go no farther back than 
this. In this point of view, necessity, not 
free agency, is a word without meaning. To 
imagine that there is any act or effect which 
is not the result of an active principle, is to 



ROUSSEAU. 1 1 1 

imagine effects without a cause, and to rea- 
son in a fallacious circle. Either there is no 
original impulse, or every original impulse 
is without any anterior cause ; so that there 
is no real will except such as is free. Man, 
then, is a free agent, and, as such, animated 
with an immaterial substance. This is my 
third Article of Faith. From these first 
three, you can readily deduce all the others 
without my continuing to number them. 

If man is active and free, he acts of him- 
self. Nothing that he does of his own free 
will can be considered as entering into the 
scheme ordained by Providence, nor can the 
latter be held responsible for it. The Crea- 
tor does not will the evil which man pro- 
duces by abusing his liberty ; but he does not 
prevent man from abusing it, whether because 
in his eyes the evil which so weak a being 
can do is very trifling in amount, or because 
it was not possible to deprive us of our power 
to do evil without impairing our free agency, 



112 ROUSSEAU. 

and thus occasioning greater evil by degrad- 
ing our nature. He made us free, not that 
we might do evil, but that we might choose 
what is good. He has enabled us so to 
choose, if we rightly employ the faculties he 
has given us; but has so limited our power 
that our abuse of our freedom cannot disturb 
the general harmony. \The evil which men 
do recoils upon themselves without effecting 
the least change in the system of the uni- 
verse, and without interfering with the con- 
tinued preservation of the human race, not- 
withstanding the destructive tendencies of 
man's own acts?) To murmur because God 
does not prevent us from doing evil, is to 
murmur because he conferred on us an ex- 
alted nature ; because he attached to our 
actions the moral qualities by which they 
are ennobled ; because he afforded us the 
opportunity of exhibiting our virtue. The 
highest enjoyment is self-approbation ; and 
it is to deserve that approbation that we are 



ROUSSEAU, 113 

placed on the earth as free agents, and sub- 
jected to the temptations of our passions and 
the restraints of conscience. 

What more could be done for us by Om- 
nipotence itself? Would it have been pos- 
sible to compose our nature of contradictions, 
and bestow the reward of virtuous conduct 
upon those who had it not in their power to 
act viciously ? What ! To prevent man 
from being wicked, ought he to have receiv- 
ed from the Creator instinct alone, and been 
made a mere animal ? iKo, God of my soul ! 
Never will I reproach thee that thou hast 
created me in thine own image, to the end 
that I might be free, good, and happy, like 
thyself]) 

(It is the abuse of our faculties which ren- 
ders us unhappy and wicked. Our disap- 
pointments, cares and sorrows proceed from 
ourselves^ (Moral evil is undeniably our 
work ; and physical evil would be nothing 
but for our vices, without which we should 
be insensible to it. Is it not for our preser- 



114 



ROUSSEAU. 



vation that nature makes us feel our wants? 
Is not bodily pain a sign that the machine 
is out of order, and a warning to direct our 
attention to the circumstance ? As for death 
— do not the wicked embitter their lives and 
ours 1 Who would desire to live forever ? 
Death is the remedy for the ills we bring 
upon ourselves; nature will not permit that 
our sufferings should be without end. How 
few are the evils to which man is subject so 
long as he retains his primitive simplicity ! 
He lives almost without diseases, as well as 
without passions, and, in general, neither 
foresees his death nor feels it when it comes. 
When he does feel it, his misery renders it 
an object of desire; and then it ceases to be 
an evil. Were we but content to be what 
we are, we should have no reason to deplore 
our fate ; but in seeking for imaginary bless- 
ings, we encounter a thousand real ills. (He 
who cannot endure a little pain must expect 
to suffer much] When we have ruined our 
constitutions by a dissipated life, we en- 



ROUSSEAU. H5 

deavor to restore them by medicines. To the 
present evil we add that which we fear in 
the future. (Our anticipations of death both 
heighten its terrors and accelerate its ap- 
proach/ > The more we strive to escape it, 
the more sensibly it affects us ; and we die 
of apprehension during our whole lives, com- 
plaining all the while of nature, on account 
of the evils we have drawn upon ourselves 
by violating her precepts. 

{Search not, O man, for the author of evil. 
Thou art thyself that author. There is no 
evil in existence save such as thou dost cause 
or suffer, and both originate with thee. Gen- 
eral evil can exist only in disorder, and I 
behold invariable order in the system of the 
world. Particular evil exists only in the 
feelings of the being that suffers ; and 
these feelings man derives from himself and 
not from nature. Fain has little hold upon 
any one who reflects but little, and has, in 
consequence, neither memory nor foresight, 



H6 ROUSSEAU. 

\Take away our pernicious civilization, our 
errors, and our vices — take away the work 
of man, and all is well. 

\Where all is well, nothing is unjust. Jus- 
tice is inseparable from goodness. Now 
goodness is the necessary result of unbound- 
ed power conjoined with that self-love which 
is essential to every being endowed with 
consciousness. He to whom all things are 
possible, extends, as it were, his own exist- 
ence with that of the beings he creates. 
His power is continually exerted in produc- 
ing and upholding. It does not operate on 
what does not exist. God is not the God of 
the dead!) (He could not be a destructive or 
malevolent being without injuring himself.) 
He whose power is unlimited cannot will 
aught but what is good.) Hence the being 
who is supremely good because he is su- 
premely powerful, must likewise be supreme- 
ly just.} Otherwise, he would be made up 
of inconsistencies ; for the love of order, out 



ROUSSEAU. 117 

of which order first arose, is what we call 
goodness; and the love of order, by which 
order is maintained, is what we call justice, 

God, it is sometimes said, owes nothing to 
his creatures. \In my opinion, he owes them 
all that he promised by bringing them into 
existence.) To give them the idea of a good, 
and make them feel the want of it, was to 
promise it to them. The more I enter into 
myself—the more I learn by my investiga- 
tions into my own nature — the more distinct- 
ly do I trace these words inscribed upon my 
soul \{Be just j and thou shalt be happy} Such, 
however, I do not find to be the case when 
I examine the present state of things : the 
bad prosper, and the good are oppressed. 
Observe, moreover, how indignant we are 
when our expectations of happiness as the 
result of virtuous conduct are disappointed. 
Conscience rises up and murmurs against 
its Creator ; it groans and cries, Thou hast \ 
deceived me ! 

" / have deceived thee, rash man 1 Who 



1 18 ROUSSEAU. 

has thus told thee? Is thy soul annihilated ? 
Hast thou ceased to exist ? O, Brutus ! O, 
my son ! Sully not thy noble life by a vol- 
untary death ! Cast not away thy hope and 
glory with thy body on the field of Philippi! 
Why sayest thou, Virtue is but a name* when 
thou art on the point of enjoying the recom- 
pense of thine 1 Dost thou imagine thou art 
about to die ? No ; thou art about to live ; 
and then it is that I will perform all that I 
have promised thee." 

One would suppose from the complaints 
of impatient mortals, that God owed them 
the reward before they had done any thing 
to deserve it, and that he was bound to pay 
them for their virtue in advance. (Ah ! let 
us first be good, and happiness will come 
afterward. Let us not demand the prize 



* The exclamation of Brutus a few moments before his 
death. Florus quotes the sentiment with approbation : 

Quam verum est quod moriens efflavit, u non in re, sed in 
verbo tantum, esse virtutem!" — (Flor. iv., 7.) 

Translator. 



ROUSSEAU. lig 

before we have vanquished, nor the wages 
before we have labored. It is not in the 
lists, said ^lutarch, that the victors in our 
sacred games are crowned ; it is after they 
have passed over the course. 

If the soul be immaterial, it may survive 
the body ; and if it survives, the ways of 
Providence are justified. (Had I no other 
proof of the immateriality of the soul than 
the prosperity of the wicked and the sorrows 
of the good in this world, that alone would 
be sufficient to remove all doubt from my 
mind.] Such a jarring discord in the univer- 
sal harmony would incite me to search for 
some explanation. I should say to myself, 
"(All is not over with us when life termi- 
nates ; all is set right at our deathY 1 might, 
indeed, be somewhat at a loss when I asked 
myself what becomes of man when every 
part of him that is discoverable by our 
senses is destroyed. To me, this question is 
relieved of all its difficulty as soon as I admit 
that he is composed of two substances. As 



J20 ROUSSEAU. 

I can perceive nothing except by my senses 
during my corporeal life, it is not strange that 
what makes no impression upon them es- 
capes my observation. When the union of 
the soul and body is broken up, I can con- 
ceive that the one may dissolve and the other 
be preserved.) Why should the destruction 
of one involve that of the other 7 On the 
contrary, their natures being so different 
they were, while together, in a state of con- 
strained union ; and when the connection 
ceases, they both return to their natural 
condition; whereby the active and living 
recovers all the vigor which it expended in 
moving the passive and dead substance. 
Alas ! (My vicious inclinations make me but 
too well aware that man is but half alive 
during his earthly existence, and that the 
life of the soul does but commence at the 
death of the body.) 

But what is that life 1 Is the soul im- 
mortal by its very nature ? I know not. 
My bounded understanding can grasp noth- 



ROUSSEAU. j 21 

ing that is unbounded. All that is called 
infinite is above my comprehension. What 
can I affirm or deny, or in what way can I 
reason respecting that of which I understand 
nothing ? I believe that the soul outlives the 
body long enough for all to be set right, but 
who can assert that this is forever 1 Still, I 
can conceive of the wearing out and destruc- 
tion of the body by the separation of its 
component parts ; (but I cannot conceive of 
such a destruction of the thinking entity ; 
and as I cannot imagine how it can die, I 
presume that it does nob As this presump- 
tion is, moreover, a consoling one, and has 
nothing unreasonable in it, why should I 
hesitate to adopt it ? 

(l feel my soul ; I recognize it both by my 
feelings and my thoughts!) I know that it 
exists, but know not what is its essence. I 
cannot reason in relation to ideas which I do 
not possess. I am well assured of one thing, 
which is, that our individual identity is kept 
up only by the memory; and that to be in 



122 ROUSSEAU. 

reality the same that I have been, I must 
remember that I have been. Now, after my 
death, I cannot recollect what I have been 
during my life without recalling at the same 
time what I have felt, and, consequently, 
what I have done ;, and I have no doubt that 
the remembrance of this will one day con- 
stitute the felicity of the good and the tor- 
ment of the bad.l On earth, a thousand 
ardent passions deaden conscience and turn 
away remorse. The humiliations and in- 
dignities which the practice of virtue draws 
down upon us, prevent us from discerning 
all its charms. /But when, freed from the 
illusions of our bodies and senses, we shall 
enjoy the contemplation of the Supreme 
Being and of the eternal truths of which he 
is the source — when the beauty of order 
shall strike every faculty of our souls, and 
we shall employ ourselves exclusively in 
comparing what we have with what we 
ought to have done — then will the voice of 
conscience resume its authoritative tone — 



ROUSSEAU. 1£3 

then will feelings of the highest intensity — 
the pure delight which flows from satisfac- 
tion with ourselves, and the bitter regret 
arising from the consciousness of self-degra- 
dation — mark the condition which each 
shall have prepared for himself. Ask not, 
my friend, if other sources of pleasure or 
pain will be found. I know not ; and that 
to which I have adverted is sufficient to 
console me for the miseries of this life and 
lead me to hope for another. I do not as- 
sert that the virtuous will be rewarded ; for 
what other good can a virtuous being expect 
than the privilege of existing in accordance 
with its nature T) But I do affirm that they 
will be happy ; because their Maker, the 
fountain of all justice, has endowed them 
with sensibility, and did not create them 
that they might suffer ; and, not having 
abused their free agency while on earth, they 
will not have been prevented by any fault 
of their own from fulfilling their destiny ; and 
as their life in this world is one of suffering, 



124 ROUSSEAU. 

they will be indemnified in the next) This 
conviction is based not so much on my opin- 
ion of man's merit, as on the idea which I 
entertain of goodness as inseparable from 
the divine essence. I merely suppose the 
laws of order to be observed, and God to be 
consistent with himself. 

Do not inquire of me whether the torments 
of the wicked will be eternal, or whether 
their condemnation to everlasting suffering 
be compatible with the goodness of the 
Author of their being. Of this, too, I know 
nothing ; and I have not the idle curiosity 
which prompts men to meddle with useless 
questions. What is it to me what will be- 
come of the wicked ? I take little interest 
in their fate. Still, I can hardly believe they 
will be doomed to endless agony. Supreme 
Justice avenges itself in this life. You, O 
nations, and your errors are its ministers ! 
The calamities which you draw upon your- 
selves by your misdeeds are the instruments 
of punishment it employs ! In your own 



ROUSSEAU. 125 

insatiable hearts, devoured by envy, avarice ; 
and ambition — in the midst of your illusive 
prosperity, the avenging passions chastise 
your crimes ! What need of seeking for a 
hell in another life 7 (In this it is found in 
the breasts of the wicked.) 

Where our mortal wants as well as our 
mad desires cease, there our passions and 
our crimes must likewise cease. What de- 
praved act could disembodied spirits commit? 
Having need of nothing, why should they be 
wicked? ' If they are destitute of our gross 
senses, and all their happiness is derived 
from the contemplation of what exists, they 
can will nothing but what is good; and he 
who is no longer wicked cannot be forever 
miserable : so, at least, I am inclined to be- 
lieve, though I have not taken the trouble to 
form a decided opinion. O, merciful and 
bounteous Being, whatever thy decrees may 
be, I adore them ! If thou inflictest eternal 
punishment upon the wicked, far be it from 
my weak reason to impugn thy justice; but 
6* 



126 ROUSSEAU. 

if, in time, the remorse of these unhappy be- 
ings passes away — if their pangs have an 
end, and the same tranquillity awaits us all 
alike — for this I praise thee ! Are not the 
wicked my brethren 1 How often have I 
been tempted to become like them ? If, 
delivered from their misery, they lose also 
the malignity by which it is accompanied ; — 
if they are destined to be happy as well as 
myself, their happiness, far from exciting 
jealousy in me, will but augment my own?) 
/->Thus, by contemplating God in his works, 
and studying him in such of his attributes as 
it was important for me to know, I gradual- 
ly enlarged and multiplied my ideas of that 
infinite Being, which were before imperfect 
and narrow. But if these ideas have become 
more exalted and expanded, they are also 
more disproportioned to the weakness of the 
human mind. As I approach in spirit the 
eternal Source of Light, his brightness daz- 
zles and confuses me, and I am forced to lay 
aside all those habits of thought derived 



ROUSSEAU. 127 

from meditation on earthly things, which 
before assisted me in my conceptions of him. 
Here God is no longer corporeal and cog- 
nizable by my senses ; the Supreme Intelli- 
gence that governs the world is no longer 
th ejworld itself; in vain do I strain and 
weary my faculties in the effort to compre- 
hend his incomprehensible essence. When 
I remember that it is this which imparts life 
and activity to the living and active sub- 
stance that directs the movements of ani- 
mated bodies, and hear it remarked that my 
soul is spiritual and that God is a spirit, I 
feel indignant at such a disparaging view of 
the divine essence. As if God and my soul 
were of the same nature ! As if God were 
not the only independent being ; the only 
one that really acts, feels, thinks, wills, of 
himself; and the one from whom we derive 
thought, feeling, activity, will, free agency, 
existence ! We are free agents only because 
he has willed that we should be such ; and 
his mysterious substance is to our souls 



12Q ROUSSEAU. 

what our souls are to our bodies. I know 
not whether he created matter, bodies, spirits, 
and the universe. The idea of creation con- 
founds me and surpasses my comprehension. 
Yet, as far as I am capable of understanding 
the subject, I believe that he did execute the 
work of creation, and I know that he gave 
form to the world and all that IS ; that he 
constituted and arranged all. 

God is, no doubt, eternal ; but can my 
mind take in the idea of eternity ? Why 
put me off with words signifying nothing ? 
I can understand that he ivas before any 
thing else ; and that he will be as long as 
any thing else subsists ; and longer still, if 
all other things should ever come to an end. 
That a being with whose nature lam unac- 
quainted, should communicate existence to 
other beings, is merely obscure and incom- 
prehensible; but that such a being and no- 
nentity should be converted into each other 
without any external cause, is a palpable 
contradiction, a manifest absurdity. 



ROUSSEAU. 129 

God is intelligent ; but how ? Man is 
intelligent when he reasons; and the Su- 
preme Intelligence is exempt from the neces- 
sity of reasoning. To it there are no such 
things as premises and conclusions — there is 
no such thing as a proposition even. It 
operates by pure intuition. It perceives 
alike all that is and all that can be ; to 
it, all truths are but a single idea, as all 
places are but a point, and all times but one 
moment. 

Human power works by means ; the divine 
power works by itself. God can because 
he wills ; his will is his power. 

(God is good : nothing is plainer. But 
goodness in man is the love of his fellows ; 
and this quality in God is the love of order ; 
for it is order that sustains the universe and 
binds every part to the whole) 
(\ am convinced that God is just. This is 
a result of his goodness. The injustice of 
men is their own work, not his. The moral 
disorder which the philosophers consider as 



130 ROUSSEAU. 

an argument against a superintending Prov- 
idence is to me a proof of his existence. But 
the justice of man consists in giving to all 
their due ; and the justice of God, in requir- 
ing from all an account of what he has 
committed to their care. 

It is by drawing necessary inferences, and 
by the right use of my reason, that I succeed 
in discovering, one after another, all these 
attributes, of which I had originally no idea. 
Yet I assert that they exist without under- 
standing them ; which is equivalent to mak- 
ing no assertion. In vain do I say, u God 
is thus or thus ; I feel it; I can prove it" I 
am no better able than before to conceive 
how God can he thus. 

/ In short, the more I strive to contemplate , 
his infinite essence, the less do I understand , 
it. He exists, however, and that is sufficient. ! 
The less I comprehend him, the more I adore 
him. I humble myself, and exclaim, " Being 
of beings, I ami because thou art ! To med- 
itate unceasingly upon thee is to rise to the 



ROUSSEAU. 131 

, source whence I sprung. The most appro- 
< priate use I can make of my reason is to 

deem myself as naught in thy presence : it 
■ is rapture to my soul, it is the delight of my 

weakness, to feel myself overwhelmed by 

thy greatness !" 



END OF EXTRACTS FROM ROUSSEAU, AND OF THE WORK. 



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